Dynamic Game Analysis in the New Land Conflicts under the Background of Urbanization

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ABSTRACT:
In the accelerating process of urbanization and social transition era, industrialization, urbanization and construction of urban-rural integration also inevitably leads to the land expropriation, land conflicts have become important issues in the development process. Application of game theory in this article, for an in-depth analysis of forming mechanism of land, building a conflict model of land expropriation, analysis of farmers’ interests in the land, local governments and the Central Government body of the game, revealing the internal mechanism of the land with a view to provide guidance and practical support for current land expropriation. Research shows that effective conflict management is the key to reform land requisition of land expropriation system design. Thus, the promotion of land expropriation order needs to perfect the land expropriation law and procedures, establish a local government land acquisition and supervision and evaluation mechanism, improving the compensation criterion for land expropriation, land arbitration dispute resolution bodies. It will be good for current science to resolve land conflicts, will promote the urbanization process in new harmony and stability in an orderly manner, can effectively promote the harmonious development of economy and society.
Keywords: land of conflict; dynamic games; new urbanization

1 Objective

Modern development of new towns. President XI Jinping made important instructions to further promoting the construction of new towns stressed that to adhere to the innovation, coordination, green, open, shared concept of development and the guidance to the urbanization of person core, promoting new sustainable and healthy development of urbanization with Chinese characteristics. New town is based on the unity of the urban and rural, urban and rural, city interactive, intensive, ecological living, characterized by the harmonious development of urbanization, are large, medium and small cities and small towns, the new rural development and cross-promoting community coordination of urbanization. Among them, Gu Shengzu view urbanization in each by 1% hundreds of millions of farmers "citizens"[1].Solved in the new town as economic sustained and healthy development of strategies, while at the same time China's limited land resources available, urbanization is relatively low, the "aggressive" land is out of control, at the same time, urban planning adjustment too fast, many local governments to "cities" impel urbanization. Associated with the occurrence of the demolition has become a remarkable phenomenon in rural areas, have seriously affected social development. To science resolve social contradictions, guide land work ordered carried out, in-depth analysis land conflict mechanism is a items very important of theory problem, research land conflict, helps land conflict theory of innovation development, helps for further perfect land policy and measures provides theory support and reality reference, to achieved public interests and interests of balance and coordination, promote people of new town of, conducive to upgrade people get sense and happiness sense, makes China features new town of continued health development.

2 Review

Scholars at home and abroad from different sides of the cause due to land acquisition has been analysed. Wei Zhuxia, Wang Dahai (2015), due to the contempt of public interests and social participation, in a new urbanization process caused by various conflicts, including land acquisition [2]. Scholars Wang gefang (2013), think advance town of is achieved Socialist modern of must requirements, now, China clear proposed and implementation has town of
strategy, produced land conflict of produced reasons is many of, mainstream views think system sex reasons, that and land related of expropriation system, and property, and social security, not perfect and its system reform exists defects, especially agricultural to property system of not reasonable, led to has land conflict of occurred [3]. Zhu Tianzhi (2014), reform of property rights system of agricultural land and land requisition system incompatibility, lead to standards of fairness in land requisition process differences, both between substantive justice and procedural justice justice issues such as missing, which triggered the conflict [4]. Muzondo LF., Barry M, DwatD. Etal (2007), driven by economic, political, policy and mechanisms drive, driven by social and cultural cause land conflicts [5]. Paterson (2002) is considered related to land conflicts with management and land-use habits, land conflicts cause not just stopping here, but based on other methods to specific case studies [6].

1. Conflict relating to a specific analysis of land expropriation system of land expropriation. Most experts believe that instead of urbanization process itself led to a land conflict, but the current land expropriation system can really lead to a land conflict. Sun Yuheng (2016) believe the country to realize the construction of new countryside, local governments are forced to house demolition, farm land expropriation, roads, local governments in order to create its own record, not in accordance with national requirements, abuse of the right to land, without appropriate compensation measures for expropriation and there is no scientific planning and use of land. Farmer of relatively weak status of social system led to the immediate interests of farmers suffer, this State should be established as soon as possible to improve the land administration system and perfect relevant laws and regulations to ensure the interests of farmers and other public service facilities [9]. Such as Zhou Guangliang, Ding Yalin (2016) believe that the current levy is imposed on rural land system, which effectively eliminated the collective right of disposition of the land, the village Committee members become agents of the State, collectively-owned land in some way into the State-owned land. National and collective land ownership boundaries are unclear, making farmers during the land acquisition process will not get attention [10]. Sorensen C (2000) for Japan to land readjustment measures of national development for the purpose of research. Study on social
problems of land has also become a foreign land one of the most important aspects of the question[11]. Focus on systematic research is not just a simple case study, as well as to feasibility analysis on characteristics of land conflicts abroad[12].

2. Land acquisition and the roles and responsibilities of Government in the process of conflict management. Home also has many scholars in land conflicts, the Government's role and responsibility of this angle to study the land conflicts. In real life, widespread government low-cost land sold, competing with the profit situation. Researchers found, land expropriation and transfer price ratio between 1:10, and gained a large amount of land the Government income. Zhong Wei (2013), as policy makers and implementers of local government, the role and status of the inertia of the advantage is easy to make some form of local government management occurred violations in land[13]. Cheng Yulong, Liu Ruiyu (2016), exchanges between local governments and farmers should be strengthened and fully aware of their demands for compensation, reduce the information asymmetry; Encourage farmers to actively participate in the work related to land expropriation in the public information about land, protect farmers ' right to participation and the right to know; Coordinating land policy, strengthen communication and consultation with farmers, farmers "Avenue of redress, reduce farmers " costs[14]. Boone C(2012) think, indeed of the downward shift in the locus of control over land allocation (through devolution of authority to county governments), there is no guarantee that citizens will be able to coordinate a land-law reform strategy that improves the individual lot of each, or even most[15].

3. Land conflicts related to the interests of the game and model analysis. Rudianto, Tantu A G (2014), policymakers and other relevant stakeholders and conflict[16]. Liu Ruiliang (2016) that land conflicts between farmers and local governments comes from local illegal land, constructed between farmers, local government and Central Government trilateral game analysis, pointing out that flaws in the existing system, proposed the existing land acquisition system need improvement[17]. Zou Xiuqing, and Zhong Xiaoyong (2010), structure has land conflict in the Central Government, and local government, and farmers three who Zhijian of dynamic game model, through game balanced probability to analysis land conflict of reasons where, reduced central inspection and farmers of activist cost, and local Government of violations returns, while improve land compensation standard, increased on illegal land of punishment efforts, makes interests subject game behavior tends to reasonable, can avoid or reduced land conflict of occurred [18].

Conflict on the issue of land expropriation in China still have many shortcomings, should
proceed from reality, taking into account the land conflicts induced by the variety of reasons for future land acquisition system of conflict rules, and provide reference for policy development. Should also be from property rights, compensation, risk assessment and early warning aspects of land expropriation system causes of conflict to find explanations.

3 Game Analysis of Land Conflicts

3.1 Stakeholders in Land Conflict and Game Strategies

Stakeholders concept was proposed by Stanford Research Institute in 1963 for the first time, that "is a group of stakeholders, without the support of the group to sustain the Organization's activities". In this land conflicts, stakeholders, specifically refers to the Central Government, local government, economic organization of farmers, developers and farmers.

(1) Farmers and Developers. Farmers and developers in the game, the developer of strategic decision-making is normal or forced to be, as developers with "economic man" distinguishing characteristics, in order to maximize the benefits, in the process of reusing land, often chooses more strategic decisions, strategic decisions of farmers is cooperation or confrontation. But due to the limited efforts, groups of farmers often join together to combat, it'll be easier for violent conflict occurs. Such condition could decrease their economic productivity[19].错误!未找到引用源。

(2) Farmers and Farmers' Economic Organization. In the game between landless peasants and peasants' collective economic organizations, peasants' collective economic organizations strategic decision is legitimate or illegal operation. Farmers' collective economic organization forms of illegal operations mainly include land expropriation in accordance with democratic procedures, notice is not meet for a village meeting or not, inequitable distribution of land expropriation compensation, privately divide, retain, divert part of the land, and so on. Collective economic organizations of illegal operations under strategic decision, the strategic decision of farmers may choose to be silent, or choose to petition, rioting and other forms of protest. Therefore, the strategic decision is obedience, struggle of the farmers or to please.

(3) Farmers and Local governments. Game farmers and local government, the local Government's strategic decision is lawful or unlawful expropriation of land expropriation. Illegal land requisition forms are mainly of local Government used forced land requisition, expropriation procedures are not transparent, compensation is not in
place. Strategic decisions are rights or no rights of the farmers, farmers' rights mainly in the form of skipping appeal on government departments, such as fighting or violent attacks.

(4) the Collective Economic Organizations of Farmers and Local Governments. Under the existing land requisition system, to enter the market of collective land, must pass the State levy, later turned into State-owned land can be traded on the land market, the State does not allow the rural collective economic organization as owner of the land directly dealing with developers. In this way, on both sides of the game, the strategic decision is to accept the expropriation of peasants' collective economic organization system or collective land directly entering local government strategic decision is implemented or not, land expropriation system of land expropriation system.

(5) local government and Central Government. As with "rational people" thinking local, regional economic development goals of internal drive and external needs of local fiscal income, wants to use the land revenue. Thus, in these two games, strategic decisions of the provincial Government was lawful or unlawful expropriation of land expropriation, the Central Government's strategic decision to investigate or not to investigate.

Farmers and developers, farmers' collective economic organizations, and local government relationship exists between the three parties, local governments and developers, farmers, peasants' collective economic organization and the central relationship between the Quartet, as can be seen, farmers, local governments in the relationships among stakeholders complex game, associated more with other parties. As shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1  Land stakeholders in conflict game diagrams

3.2 Design and Analysis of Game Model

From the perspective of game theory, game participant is rational, because of the participation of non-rational reasons arising from land conflicts, not within the scope of this paper. According to local government, Central Government and the farmer's property and interests, dynamic game analysis, respectively. Assumption: the Central Government's supervision and inspection costs for \( C_c \); Central Government revenue \( B_c \); Local government legitimate land acquisition costs for \( C_L \); legitimate the expropriation of local government revenue will be \( B_L \); Local government financial penalties \( F \), the payoff is \( B \); Local Government taking lawful expropriation proceeds for \( B_L \); When farmers' local governments of illegal land acquisition Act submissive, the payoff for \( C_{L3} \); Farmers petition costs for \( D_L \), the payoff is \( C_{L2} \); Central Government to investigate local government costs of illegal land acquisition Act \( C_L \), which \( B_c \) for social stability and the credibility of \( I_u \).

3.2.1 Land Conflicts of Central and Local Government in Dynamic Games

Local governments as land acquisition and execution of one of the actors is a land conflict, as
overseer of the expropriation and the Central Government, local governments regulate illegal land acquisition Act. Therefore, in the process of land acquisition, local government and Central Government due to the inconsistencies of the two goals, there has been a dynamic game.

The Central Government and local governments in land conflicts in game theory for the formation of the basic elements of the model are as follows: participants: the Central Government is C, local government is L; Local government policy space for the SL={implementation, violation}, policy space for the SC={review of the Central Government, does not examine}. Above assumes that the game between Central and local governments, the payoff function: UL for the benefit of local government functions, UC for the revenue function of the Central Government. Game between Central and local government and proceeds as follows. Players’ payoff matrix as shown in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government</th>
<th>The Central Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review (未找到引用源。)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal (1—未找到引用源。)</td>
<td>Strategy 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B_c - C_c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal (未找到引用源。)</td>
<td>Strategy 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F + B_c - C_c$, $B - F - P$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Assuming a given probability $\beta$ case (Local governments against the probability of $\beta$), the Central Government implemented regulatory review (未找到引用源。= 1), without regulatory review (未找到引用源。= 0). Expected returns are as follows:

1. 未找到引用源。 (1)
2. 未找到引用源。 (2)
3. 未找到引用源。 = 未找到引用源。 (3)
4. 未找到引用源。 = 未找到引用源。 (4)

If local governments of illegal land acquisition probability is less than $\frac{C_c}{F + B_c}$, 未找到引用源。
the Central Government's best strategy is to choose not to supervise and inspect the implementation of the policy of land expropriation. When local governments of illegal land acquisition is greater than the Central Government's supervision and inspection of Central Government land policy implementation.

(2) So in a given cases (for Central Government review of probability), local legal land (1) and the illegal expropriation of local government (β) expected revenues as follows:

\[ \text{错误!未找到引用源。} \]

\[ \text{错误!未找到引用源。} \]

\[ \text{错误!未找到引用源。} \]

\[ \text{错误!未找到引用源。} = \text{错误!未找到引用源。} \]

If the Central Government supervision and inspection of land policy implementation by chance is less than the optimal strategy is to choose the law of local government expropriation; When the Central Government supervision and check the implementation of the policy of land expropriation is greater than the optimal strategy is to choose a legitimate local government land expropriation. According to the balance of probabilities, it can be seen that local governments take illegal land acquisition probability of supervision and inspection costs showed a positive relationship with the Central Government, and local government financial penalties is a reverse relationship; And the Central Government's supervision and inspection of the probability of earnings showed a positive relationship with the local illegal land acquisition, and the achievement of economic penalties and damage to local governments is a reverse relationship.

3.2.2 Dynamic Game with Local Governments and Farmers in Land Conflict

Farmer was one of the participants in the land conflict, but local governments in the process of land expropriation has a dual role, implementing land policy on the one hand, on the other hand is to increase local revenue and meet performance needs, low price of land and huge land sales and rent revenue. Therefore, in the process of land acquisition, farmers and local governments due to the inconsistencies of the two goals, there has been a dynamic game. In a dynamic game model of local governments and farmers, the essential elements are as follows:
If local governments of illegal land acquisition probability of local government legitimate land acquisition probability of local governments is L, farmers are H, participants for the collection. Assume that farmers predict local governments the possibility of irregularities, it will monitor rights violations complaints to local governments in order to safeguard their interests. Therefore, Local Government policy space for ={legal offence}, Farmer H={rights of policy space, not rights}. Players' payoff matrix is as follows:

**Tab.2 The strategy game between local peasants and governments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>Local Governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Legal (1-错误未找到引用源。)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategy 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$C_{L2}D_{L2}B_{L2}C_{L2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No rights (1-错误未找到引用源。)</td>
<td>Strategy 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$C_{L2}B_{L2}C_{L2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Assuming a given probability 错误未找到引用源。 case (local government law probability 错误未找到引用源。), the behavior of farmers' rights (错误未找到引用源。=1) and farmers are not defending their rights (错误未找到引用源。=0) expected value:

错误未找到引用源。 \( \text{(5)} \)

错误未找到引用源。 \( \text{(6)} \)

令错误未找到引用源。 错误未找到引用源。 =错误未找到引用源。.

If probability is less than 错误未找到引用源。, farmers choose not to activist of illegal land acquisition for optimal strategies; If local governments are illegal land acquisition probability greater than 错误未找到引用源。, then farmers select the rights for the optimal strategy.

(2) In the case of the given $\beta$, local governments use legitimate land acquisition (错误未找到引用源。=1) and illegal land acquisition (错误未找到引用源。=0) expected value:
If farmers adopt a policy activist probability \( \frac{B-B_2+C_4}{C_2+p} \), then the optimal strategy of local government is illegal expropriation; If farmers use rights policy is greater than \( \frac{B-B_2+C_4}{C_2+p} \), then the optimal strategy of local government is the legitimate land acquisition. According to the equilibrium probability, it can be seen that probability of illegal land requisition and farmer rights protection costs of local Government showed a positive relationship, and the improvement of compensation criterion for land expropriation after farmers' rights is a reverse relationship; meanwhile, compensation standard probability of farmer rights and local Government improve is a reverse relationship and damage to his legacy, and illegal land acquisition proceeds of local Government showed a positive relationship. Therefore, in order to prevent the occurrence of conflicts between local governments and farmers in the process of land expropriation, compensation standards for farmers should be increased, increasing the penalty for illegal expropriation of local governments and reduce farmers' costs, you can make the game more balanced, can effectively avoid the occurrence of land conflicts.

### 3.2.3 Dynamic Game Farmers in Land Conflicts with the Central Government

Farmers themselves and the Central Government does not have a direct interest, but if the local Government's unlawful land expropriation violated farmers' interests, and the Central Government in the entire process of land expropriation as a supervisor, to regulate the local illegal land acquisition Act, but by investigating the hard questions, the central government investigation is restricted. Therefore, in the process of land acquisition, farmers and inconsistent because the target of the Central Government, there has been a dynamic game.

Farmers in land conflicts with the Central Government in the form of basic elements of the model are as follows:

- **Participants:** Farmers for H, the Central Government as CG, participants set for \( I = \{H, CG\} \);
- **Policy space:** Central Government policy space for \{investigation, not investigated\}; Farmers'
policy space for SH={obedience, appeal}. At this point, individual farmers and the Central Government return functions as follows, players of the payoff matrix in table 3.

### Tab.3 The strategy game between central peasants and governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>the Central Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obedience</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 1</td>
<td>$F+Be-C_e, C_{L2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 2</td>
<td>$0, C_{L2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appeal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 3</td>
<td>$Be+Iu+F-C_e, C_{L2}-D_L$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 4</td>
<td>$-Be+(-Iu), C_{L2}-D_L$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proceeds from this matrix can be obtained, but the game there is a dominant strategy equilibrium (investigation, not investigated), that is for the Central Government, whether local farmers the illegal land requisition is obedience or disobedience, its dominant strategy is investigated; For farmers, no matter what the Central Government for local governments of illegal land acquisition Act is to investigate or not to investigate, his dominant strategy is obedience. So the Central Government and the farmer with, assume that local governments are already illegal land acquisition and the Central Government has confirmed, it has a dominant strategy of the Central Government and farmers (investigation, not investigated). However, in the first two game, already know that local governments take offence of this strategy depends on the farmers of land expropriation costs and the compensation criterion for land expropriation, the central inspection cost, and the Central Government for local governments factors such as illegal land acquisition and economic penalties, and central supervision and farmers rights both directly related. In addition, farmers in any policies of the Central Government, its performers to petitions received less income than obedience to the proceeds of the policy, which is not conducive to encouraging farmers' behaviour. Therefore, the occurrence of illegal land acquisition Act to curb local governments and farmers should be reduced on these costs, increase penalties for local governments of illegal land acquisition Act and maintain the credibility of the Central Government.

### 4 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
In the context of new towns at present, based on the current land conflicts as well as taking into account the interests of those involved in the game, using the game theory analysis of land interests game relation. Therefore, on the basis of people-oriented, explore the land conflict resolving mechanism of adjustment. To this end, the conflict resolution may be made from the following problem

4.1 Conclusions

4.1.1 Unsound Acquisition System, Unsound Land Management System

Through type 5 to type 8 showed that, local authorities illegal land acquisition and the Central Government's supervision and inspection are related, associated with local government financial penalties against. Central Government supervision and inspection of the probability of earnings showed a positive relationship with the local illegal land acquisition, and the achievement of economic penalties and damage to local governments is a reverse relationship. This shows that the land acquisition system design plays a very important role to resolve conflicts, and current land expropriation system of land expropriation system is not perfect, unsound land management system deficiencies, specifically the following two aspects.

(1) Land Expropriation Systems are not Perfect

First, the definition of property rights of rural land are not clear, farmers ' land property rights are unclear. With the development of new type of urbanization, and agricultural modernization, rural land property system began to be taken seriously. Existing laws and regulations in the "collective ownership" is not clear, especially the right of collective ownership and contractual relationships between is not clear, when it comes to land acquisition and land ownership changes behavior, such as prone to conflict. Secondly, the procedures to be standard, relief mechanisms also need to be improved. When peasants the right to participation is not implemented, farmers ' real intentions cannot truly reflect; Land acquisition and implementation procedures, the lack of detailed operation and effective regulation, generally associated with statutory procedures are not in place. In addition, land disputes to relief mechanism is missing, timely resolve channel conflicts due to land, the lack of legitimate organizations representing farmers ' interests, the reasonable demands of farmers unable to communicate in a timely manner, easily lead to escalated conflict.

(2) Land Administration Systems are not Perfect

First, land-use planning system is not perfect. Strong on the surface of land planning, structured, is a leader in land management, but in practice there is inadequate planning legal
effect, adjust relatively frequent changes and subjective, problems such as insufficient public participation. In addition, the absence of village land use planning and management are relatively weak, rural construction land and reasonable demand cannot be met and construction in rural areas and that illegal, over issues such as interwoven together. Second, the regulation was not enough, illegal disposal is difficult. Current penalty for illegal land requisition acts mainly fines, penalties and not enough accountability. Moreover, some local governments, national and provincial-level key projects are the subject of illegal use of land, land and resources administration has no means of enforcement, in the service of economic development and strict implementation of the national land management policies, are often in a dilemma.

4.1.2 Compensation System are not Perfect

Through type 5 to type 8 showed that, local authorities illegal land acquisition costs was a positive relationship between probability and farmers, and farmers' rights after the increase shows the relationship of the compensation criterion for land expropriation; Probability of farmer rights and local compensation standards improve and damage to his legacy is a reverse relationship and illegal expropriation of income of local Government showed a positive relationship. This shows that the compensation system for conflict resolution has a very important role, and the present compensation system of land expropriation compensation system defects in imperfect, specifically the following three aspects.

First, the single land expropriation. Since most peasants low education level, no other skills currently in place are appropriate compensation criterion for land expropriation compensation and hybrid forms of incomplete compensation, lack of a uniform standard, only take into account the collective land property rights to the contents of the compensation, without considering the added value and benefits of sustainable development. Meanwhile, imperfect social security system of landless peasants, landless peasants social security levels, security implementation and inadequate supervision, hard to do, "farmers could land without decline in living standards, long-term livelihood security."

Second, the compensation standard is low in General. Current compensation range is narrow and is strictly limited to direct loss, compensation cost is not reasonable, overall standard for compensation well below the land-use right transfer of part of the land value. In addition, the standard level of compensation also has many problems. Attachments such as compensation for athletes and the ground is no clear standard for compensation, collective-owned land houses land acquisition and relocation management policy gaps, different projects, regional
compensation standards differ, the old and new policies and other issues. Thirdly, to enhance communication with farmers, fully aware of their demands for compensation, reduce the information asymmetry.

4.1.3 Deeper Institutional Mechanisms the problem is not Resolved

First, urgent transformation of mode of economic development, performance appraisal system in urgent need of improvement. And scale management is still in the primary stage of agricultural modernization, industrialization and urbanization levels needs to be improved; Plus local government performance evaluation system is not perfect, the local government for investment demand, tends to blindly expand the scale of land acquisition, assignment of the cheap land prices, and intensify social contradictions.

Second, land value increment-driven land, the existing tax system needs to be improved. During the period of January to July in 2014, local land sales for 2.4961 trillion yuan, compared with 22.2% per cent, while the local financial revenue was 4.6637 trillion yuan, land sales by local fiscal income remains high. Huge land driven value-added benefits local governments manage the land, land size is difficult to control and forced demolitions can not be eliminated.

Third, the diverse public interests in social transition period, government management needs to be improved. Currently China has entered a period of social transformation and the prominent contradictions and diversified interests, interests demand diversification and complicate the tangle of interests and other characteristics. Resolve the land acquisition and relocation of conflicts is a complex project, the higher levels of government management. Not sensitive to social changes in some places, enough respect to farmers' rights and interests, working method simple and crude.

4.2 Policy Recommendations

(1) Improve the System of Land Expropriation

Firstly, to reform the land expropriation procedures, follow the "open, fair and just" principles to fully protect farmers' land right to be informed, to participate. Establishing hearing procedures for land acquisition, which helps ensuring the realization of landless farmers' right to be informed, to participate, but also to resolve land conflicts in rural areas. In the process of policy formulation, maximum response the willingness of farmers, farmers' answers do not allow this, satisfy the highest standards; Secondly, strengthening of multisectoral management, management is not a single sector, specialized supervision among various independent
departments within the Government.

Second, compliance of local government land acquisition, satellite aerial technology to monitor the land, reduce the presence of illegal land acquisition; In the course of land acquisition to reduce illegal land acquisition and land indicators for local government; Government to strengthen the policy advocacy, access and broaden the channels of expression of interest are also effective ways of resolving social conflicts. Must be active to improve and perfect the grass-roots elections, for farmers to express their own wishes, choose people who can represent their interests into local Government on behalf of farmers' exercise of power; Broaden the channels of complaint letters and visits, and build effective complaint mechanisms, and demands timely response to the complainant, obtain the complainant's trust and understanding; Mass media and social function of non-governmental organizations in expressing the interests of farmers, enhance the effectiveness of expression of interest. Vital interests are damaged.

Third, standardize procedures. The full implementation of "first compensation after land acquisition and relocation system, encouraged by the original land-owned units, reducing friction in demolition work. Establish land acquisition and relocation of land administrative mediation and review system to ensure that farmers' right of appeal.

Finally, set up to protect farmers' land use rights, coordinated new farmland property right system of the balance of interests of the parties. First, the right to land ownership to farmers groups issued to ensure collective ownership of land belonging to the village of representative members of the villagers' collective rights, so that farmers become masters of the land; Secondly, achieving separation of ownership and use of agricultural land, giving farmers access to land disposal and earning opportunities; After the farmer's land be expropriated, enabling farmers to enjoy the productivity gains from the original land, and ensure protection of their households; While, farmers of Homestead and arable land should get social security, agricultural to, and Homestead, individual farmers land property is according to original of land does right registration data determine, and collective land ownership is according to population distribution to common enjoys land of property, this determine way exists many of defects, led to land property of subject unknown and land divided of not specification, also let related institutions down price forced levy land. Encourage farmers to actively participate in the work related to land expropriation, information about public land, protect farmers' right to participation and the right to know.
(2) Improving the Land Management System, the Establishment of Regulatory Supervision and Project Groups

First, the State should establish as soon as possible to improve the land administration system and perfect relevant laws and regulations to ensure farmers' interests; Empowerment of collective land use rights transfer, transfer, mortgage, such as a complete property rights, right of rural land with the same price. Meanwhile, collective land to clearly defined public service facilities for non-public purposes of construction or when all land for individual farmers, to combine farmers' actual needs and changes in market values, to develop a comprehensive compensation system to fully protect farmers' interests, prevent flooding of land expropriation right and not fair use.

Second, strict land-use planning, strengthening supervision of law enforcement. Improve the scientific level of general land use planning and improve public participation in planning, a clear resettlement of landless peasants of land space and index; Control the amount of agricultural land into building land, regulate development and increase of agricultural land and the amount of cultivated land, thereby avoiding frequent adjustments and modifications, and earnestly safeguard the planning authority and stability. Advancing the opening of land management information, increased compliance enforcement.

Third, strengthening supervision of local government, public official micro-blog, micro-signal may be established, regularly releases Government land master plan and related documents, as well as lists of staff involved in the work of the Government; A special monitor phone calls, set up a special inspection, strictly control land indicators for local government, strictly control the use of land; increase financial penalties for persons responsible for illegal land requisition, and if found illegal land requisition, grab a penalty ten.

(3) Improve the Compensation System, a variety of Parallel Measures to protect Farmers' Interests

Take a wide range of compensation, so as to ensure long-term livelihoods for the farmers, effectively relieve their worries, so land-lost farmers to well solve the employment pension issues such as health and education. Perfection of compensation system of land expropriation in monetary compensation should also be integrated in other ways: a replacement compensation. Expropriation of land with the addition of replacement land suitable for agriculture, not only to meet the Government's land development and utilization, and scale production and management of agricultural land can be achieved; Second, equity compensation. Collective construction land for public service, equity share corresponding to
the amount of compensation can be used instead. In terms of concrete implementation, to adopt a differentiated approach, exploring the full respect for farmers’ needs and aspirations, the implementation of a policy of compensation models. The other hand, establish market prices as a benchmark of the compensation criterion for land expropriation. Insist on compensation amounts according to the original use of discounted future earnings, revenue standards with dynamic adjustment of price indices, economic growth.

(4) Building a Land Conflict early Warning and Coordination Mechanisms

First, the establishment of illegal land acquisition and accountability mechanisms, and a sound judicial remedy. Accelerate the land management law and collective land requisition and the research development of the ECO, in the process of land acquisition and relocation of extreme events caused by the Government, about the direction and implementation of the administrative liability of those, having infringed the penal law, criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law; Explore the establishment of a quasi-judicial nature of land dispute arbitration mechanism to guarantee participation of landless peasants in the process of land acquisition and relocation rights and right to relief.

Second, resolve land conflicts in rural areas, with the emphasis on prevention. In a new urbanization process, inevitably involves the expropriation of land, and contradictions between different subjects. From source to prevent land expropriation-induced conflicts and contradictions, effective early warning is to resolve land conflicts in the bud, stop upgrading and diffusion, in particular to prevent spread into the great and vicious land group of the highlights of the event. In addition, the establishment of inter subjectivity, interdepartmental coordination mechanism on the prevention and resolution of conflicts due to land expropriation and is also very necessary.
Reference


