



THE NEED FOR A NEW ENLIGHTENMENT

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Abstract

This paper develops the theme of my review of Steven Pinker's book 'Enlightenment Now', published by Filozofia Nokia earlier this year. It explains in greater detail the case for a new enlightenment, which derives from the lack of scientific realism in social theory. Present day theories of morals, economics and politics all have their origins in eighteenth century Europe, when Cartesian rationalism was the preferred methodology for scientific theorising. This paper advocates the case for scientific realism in morals, economics and politics, not that of apriorism, which was an eighteenth century fetish.

Keywords: progress, patterns of growth, inequality and debt, targeted demand management, scientific realism

1.

Despite all the social progress that has occurred, which Steven Pinker's latest book *Enlightenment Now* celebrates, the world needs a new enlightenment. The case for reason, science, humanism and progress, developed in the old enlightenment, has served us well in many ways, but the social, economic and political theory developed in the eighteenth century must be replaced. For one thing, the world is in the midst of a digital revolution, which has

changed radically and fundamentally our social connectedness, access to information, and ways of doing things. These developments have a major impact on our working conditions, our environment, and on the kinds of institutions and governments we will need for the creation and maintenance of civil society. Secondly, the Third World of the twentieth century is now engaged in the greatest industrial revolution in world history, and, barring catastrophes (such as a world war, or a major climate-change crisis), everyone will be enjoying Western standards of living within the lifetimes of today's children. So, at the very least, we need to take stock of how we view the world, and interact with each other, and with the world around us, to better cope with this new reality. We need a new enlightenment, I will argue, in order to do this.

There is a gathering momentum for such a movement. Major works, and many published papers, are expressing their deep discontent with current ways of thinking. Whatever you might think of the individual contributions to this movement, they indicate a groundswell of radical thought. I list some of them, along with comparable publications in the period of the Scientific Revolution and of the European Enlightenment itself, in the references cited at the end of this paper.

My initial thought when reading Pinker's book was that it is a powerful defence of everything that social humanists, like me, really stand for. The claim that there has been great progress all around the world in the last two-hundred-and-fifty years, and that it has occurred on almost every social front, is undoubtedly true. His book rams this message home. But it also gave me cause for concern. What has been achieved may seem to be the realization of what many of us have spent our lives trying to promote, but also seems to have been done by means to which we are actually strongly opposed. So have we social humanists been wasting our time?

I ask this, because the progress globally, on almost every social front, would seem to have occurred as a natural result of the growing reach of free-market capitalism, and the values of humanism, reason and science are not the drivers of modern capitalism. On the contrary, most people in the Western capitalist world would appear to be either indifferent to these values, or scornful of them. In the world of postmodernism, scientific theories are conceptualised as the 'stories' that scientists tell themselves. Think of the West's response to the problem of man-made climate change. One might almost say that, somehow, social progress has been made, on all of its different measures, *despite* the values of the business community. How could this possibly be the case?

It is the case, I will argue, because the progress that has occurred has not been uniform, and the patterns of development in the wealthy countries of the West have been very different from those occurring in the Third World. In the West, there had been major developments of multipurpose technologies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which spurred their growth and development enormously. Then, in the late twentieth century and into the early twenty-first, the policy of globalisation created a world-wide industrial revolution. Since about 1980, this global revolution has lifted well over a billion people out of poverty. According to a World Bank report in 2017, China alone has rescued 850 million of their own people from this awful condition, thereby reducing the rate of poverty in China to just 1.5%. Nothing like this has ever occurred before; it is unique in world history.

The rich countries of the Western world have also profited greatly from the industrial revolutions occurring in the Third World, but they have done so in ways that are very different from those who were themselves engaged in these revolutions. The rich countries of the Western world have participated in what I call the 'neoliberal revolution', whose values are manifestly not those of science, reason, humanism and progress. They are, rather, those of democracy and enlightened self-interest, which are Old Enlightenment values. Participants in this neoliberal revolution have felt free to use their economic powers just as they wished, provided they acted lawfully, while the changed conditions of trade, in the economically liberated circumstances of the neoliberal era, greatly increased the power of money. It did so, because it meant that the rich nations of the world could dominate the poorer ones, and use their cheap labour to promote their own interests. This, in turn, increased the power of the multinational corporations, and hence of their directors and CEOs.

As a consequence, the wealthy nations of the world got even wealthier with globalisation, but they did not get wealthier in the same way as the poorer ones. The poorer nations of the world got wealthier mostly from the bottom up (by greatly reducing levels of poverty), while the rich nations of the world mostly got wealthier from the top down (by exploiting the cheap labour of the Third World). Fundamentally, this explains the patterns of growth that have occurred since the neoliberal era began.

Thus, in the past forty years or so, global corporations, and those exporting basic commodities, have enjoyed all the benefits of free trade, and of greatly increased demand for their products, and, inevitably, these positive results showed up on the global charts. But, those who benefited most in the West were the ones who needed it least. The wages, conditions of work,

and social service provisions for the relatively poor in the Western democracies did not increase substantially, or, as John Lanchester has argued strongly, they did not increase at all.

In the *London Review of Books* of July 2018, Lanchester wrote that the period from the mid-seventies to the present is the longest period in recorded economic history in which real incomes in the UK have declined.

‘Recorded economic history’, he says, means ‘as far back as current techniques can reach, which is back to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. [The decline is] worse than the decades that followed the Napoleonic Wars, worse than the crises that followed them, worse than the financial crises that inspired Marx, worse than the Depression, worse than both world wars. That is a truly stupendous statistic, and if you knew nothing about the economy, sociology or politics of a country, and were told that single fact about it—that real incomes had been falling for the longest period ever—you would expect serious convulsions in the national life.’

He goes on to say that the US has fared no better.

‘... the real median hourly income in the US is [now] about the same as it was in 1971. Anyone time-travelling back to the early 1970s would have great difficulty in explaining why the richest and most powerful country in the history of the world had four and a half decades without pandemics, country-wide disaster or world war, accompanied by unprecedented growth in corporate profits, and yet ordinary people’s pay remained the same.’

John Lanchester is a notable and well-informed journalist, and his reporting is reliably accurate. Why then is the global picture so rosy, while the local one in the capitalist West so grim? The answer, I believe, is that the Western world has huge problems now of inequality and debt. Those who have reaped the benefits of the neoliberal era are naturally determined to hold on to their wealth. The multibillionaires could not reasonably hope to retain their obscene wealth if they stood alone in the hierarchy. But they are not alone. The market values of inner city houses have skyrocketed, and the old middle classes have mortgaged themselves to the hilt to get into the booming property markets. Consequently, the middle classes are in no mood to help the poor recover. As the property investors see it, they are where they are in virtue of the debts they have incurred, and, from their point of view, these debts have dug a huge hole in the economy. This is a hole into which they are in danger of falling, so any moves to make the capitalist economies of the Western world fairer are likely to be strongly resisted, not only by the billionaires, but also by the heavily indebted middle classes.

I do not know how to resolve this dilemma. It is one of the issues that a new enlightenment will need urgently to consider. It may well be that the West will need to overcome its debt problems with a Jubilee, in which certain classes of debts are collectively reduced or forgiven, as Steve Keen has suggested (You Tube, February 6, 2018).

All of the events that led to the creation of this dilemma would appear to be the natural products of the rapidly expanding reach of global capitalism. This has divided Western societies into economic classes—rich and poor—by as wide a gulf as has ever existed in human history. And, since big money is raw economic power—i.e. the power to buy whatever goods or services that anyone might ever want to buy—the global spread of capitalism may well have sealed the fate of democratic governance. For democratic governance depends on the legitimacy of its electoral processes, and its ways of acquiring and disseminating socially relevant information. But many individuals in the West now possess orders of magnitude of wealth comparable to the wealth of nations. As a result, as we have seen in this past decade, the electoral processes of the democratic world are now becoming more and more like the staged elections of the autocratic states of Latin America, Eurasia, and Africa. Democracy itself is in serious danger.

We need a new enlightenment, therefore, that speaks of and to the world as it is today, not just the one that occurred in the eighteenth century. We need an enlightenment that would get people behind the forces that are capable of driving progress *in all sectors of all communities*.

What have we been using instead? Adam Smith's nineteenth century economic theory was elegantly developed and mathematically articulated, but the assumptions upon which it was built are still plainly eighteenth century. Kant's moral theory remains the primary basis for moral thinking in much of the Western world, and has never been seriously challenged. For example, while John Rawls and Robert Nozick have written notable books on political theory recently, their methodologies are still Kantian—involving appeals to what are considered by them to be obvious synthetic *a priori* truths.

2.

But in the course of my career as a philosopher, I have become convinced that European Enlightenment philosophy is seriously deficient. Eighteenth century theories of morals, economics and politics are incompatible with scientific realism, as that theory is now understood, and do not provide acceptable theoretical models, (as I have argued in Ellis 2012

and 2017). These eighteenth century theories are abstract and rationalistic in character (like systems of geometry, or rational mechanics), not scientifically realistic theories of the kinds we are capable of developing today. They have to be applied before they can tell us anything useful about reality. Moreover, they are based on the questionable axioms that human beings are essentially rational and self-interested, and that things are basically worth what individuals are prepared to pay for them.

The abstract theories of geometry and Newtonian mechanics were also developed with certain kinds of objects or structures in mind as their physical manifestations. In the mechanical theory of heat, for example, gases are represented as myriads of perfectly elastic particles in random motion in a container of some kind made with some perfectly rigid material. The pressure is then identified as the rate of change of momentum of the particles at the surface of the vessel, and the temperature as the average kinetic energy of the particles in the container. Then, using this model, it is possible to work out relationships between temperature, pressure and volume.

The eighteenth century theory of economics was a theory of this kind, and its model was that of a village market attended only by the suppliers of goods and services and their purchasers. To make things calculable, it was assumed that all of the attendees were ideally rational, self-interested, and perfectly well informed. That is, the participants in this perfect market were, by definition, rationally self-interested beings. The formal theory, which eventually developed out of this model, is the one known as neo-classical economics. This was Adam Smith's basic conception. Versions of this theory were developed by Léon Walras and Alfred Marshall late in the nineteenth century. Léon Walras (1874) was responsible for the equilibrium model of the neo-classical theory.

We still use this simplistic and manifestly unsatisfactory model invented by Adam Smith in the mid-eighteenth century as our model of social reality for nation states. For Smith, the government of the country was a distant body, which had no substantial interest in local markets. And, as there were no banks or governments in village markets, there were no such things in Smith's model. So the economic model employed has no government, no banks or lending institutions, no corporations, no social structures, and no real money.

I believe, however, that economic theories should be much more like meteorology than Newtonian dynamics, by which Adam Smith's theory was inspired. It should be developed empirically from anthropologically realistic assumptions about large numbers of human

beings living in social groups, and organized in various kinds of ways in various kinds of social structures. One would expect, therefore, that economics would be a very complex subject, which would have to deal with the behaviour of nation states, governments, currencies, banks, families and multinational corporations, which trade with each other in a wide range of specified ways. To manage such a complex subject, one would expect economic institutes to be established in every advanced state to calculate and map the patterns of interaction that might be expected to occur, using the strategies that weather forecasters do to deal with their complex bodies of data.

This suggestion is a radical one. It would require the gathering of a great deal of regional data on a very wide range of topics. But with this technology, I believe, we could take most of the speculation out of economic planning, and do it all scientifically in suitably equipped research institutes. There should also be a global institute of this kind to consider the issues that affect all of the relevant groups of people. It should be staffed by senior economists of the various national and multinational groupings to deal with global economics, and national or regional institutes to deal with the national or regional issues.

Instead, the village-market model of Adam Smith is still the preferred one at every level, and this is surely absurd. The weather predictions we need around the world now have excellent scientific backing, and agriculture everywhere has greatly benefited from this. Why then do we not do the same with our economic planning? The reason is, I believe, that the economically most powerful people in the world have much to gain from keeping it simplistic and intuitive, thus disguising the nature of the problem as one of freedom versus tyranny.

Weather forecasting, on the other hand, takes dozens of different factors into account when it is making the maps that graziers and agriculturalists need and rely upon. Ocean temperatures, ocean currents, mountain ranges, prevailing winds, arctic melting events, CO₂ levels in the atmosphere, and so on are all relevant to the global weather. Long-term patterns have now emerged. There are, for examples, el niños and la niñas, which depend upon the ocean temperatures at various latitudes in the Pacific. Why do we not have comparable economic maps, detailing where unemployment, for example, is to be found, how serious it is, and the kinds of workforces that exist in the various localities? We should not be trying to increase demand globally, or even nationally, in order to deal with local problems. Such broad sweep strategies belong to the eighteenth century. We should now be working specifically, region by region, to generate prosperity everywhere.

If, for example, we have an unemployment problem in the western suburbs of Sydney, or in the southern suburbs of Perth, then we should be seeking to create appropriate developments in these areas, which would create suitable work for the people who live in them. But, what our government would probably do, if they did anything at all, is reduce interest rates, or offer tax cuts to big business, in order to stimulate the economy as a whole. But tax cuts are not what are needed, and there is no guarantee, or even likelihood, that they will solve the problem. Good science and commonsense both tell us that we should abandon trickle-down economic theory, and return to the scientifically targeted demand management strategies of the welfare state era.

The argument for using the supply-side economic strategies, as we do now, is a very old-fashioned one. It is pre-Keynesian. It is precisely the kind of strategy that derives from a rationalist theory of the economics, in which economic principles are thought of as genuine laws of nature. The troubles with the alternative demand-side economic management strategies are alleged to be (a) that they substitute government preferences for individual ones, and therefore make the markets for goods and services in these areas less pure than they would otherwise be, and (b) that they reduce the economic freedoms that individual entrepreneurs would have in social democratic countries to do what they think should be done. For these reasons, you will never hear neoliberal economists speak out in favour of the Keynesian strategy of demand management. Nor will you ever hear them speak of ‘targeted growth’ or of ‘a social wage’. But all are possible, and all are needed.

3.

Rationalistic theories certainly have their place in the physical sciences, and in logic and mathematics. But I would argue that scientific realism is the required metaphysical framework for any respectable theory in the social sciences¹—not abstract theoretical modelling.

Let us recall the history and philosophy of science, which led to the Enlightenment. In 1687, the young Isaac Newton published his *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (hereafter, ‘the *Principia*’). In this book, Newton developed a finally convincing solution to the ancient problems of the shape, structure and dynamics of the heavens. His grand solution did not fit well with Aristotle’s *a priori* vision of the Cosmos (as set out in Book 1 of *De*

¹ See Section 4 below.

Caelo). But Newton's *Principia*, in which it was contained, was a powerful system of dynamics, which was developed, in Aristotelian fashion, from what he believed to be the self-evident truths of dynamics.

The methodology of the *Principia* was therefore that of pure theory, or 'rationalist', as it would now be described. That is, it proceeded from what he called his 'axioms' of motion, (which he explained, but did not attempt to justify). And, for reasons given in my old 1965 paper, he must have believed them to be self-evident, just as most people had then supposed the axioms of Euclidean geometry to be.

The *Principia* was a theoretical masterpiece, as indeed Euclidean geometry was in its time. It created, not only a research program for philosophers and scientists everywhere to pursue. It convinced nearly all of the intellectual elite of Europe that the world really is ultimately rational, i.e. *law-governed* and *a priori* intelligible. In his *Discourse on Method*, René Descartes had argued that 'all things, to the (scientific) knowledge of which mankind is capable', must be knowable *a priori*, and, just as in geometry, derivable from what is thus known by *a priori* reasoning. And the *Principia* seemed to show that this was indeed the case in cosmology. As Alexander Pope said: 'Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night. God said: Let Newton be, and all was light.'

This revelation stimulated all of the arts and sciences of the age, and fuelled the European Enlightenment. It is no exaggeration to say that it changed the way that people everywhere understood the world in which they were living.

Continental European mathematicians and natural philosophers made nearly all the running in eighteenth century physical theory. They were, for example largely responsible for the development of the concept of energy, and, by the end of the century, the European scientists were well ahead of their British counterparts in this field. Why this should have been so is not known. But it is known that the British loved the methodology and utility of Sir Francis Bacon's crude empiricism, and had a strong distaste for Cartesian rationalism. Indeed, they were probably much more admiring of Newcomen and Watt's steam engines than they were of Newton's revolution in our basic understanding of nature. Steam engines, after all, did real work.

Bishop Berkley thought that the *Principia* was the work of a talented, but 'infidel mathematician'. He argued that: 'to be of service to reasoning and mathematical demonstration is one thing; to set forth the nature of things is another.' David Hume, also a

radical empiricist, was overtly dismissive of Newton's achievements. At the conclusion of his *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, he said, (probably with the *Principia* in mind):²

'Does [this work] contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. *Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.*'

Given its Newtonian origins, the eighteenth century philosophical revolution would probably be best described as 'the age of pure reason', or, alternatively, as the age of 'rationalism'. For the young Newton, who wrote the *Principia* in the decade or so before its publication, was surely the main inspiration for the great works of Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith in the fields of morality and social theory. They thought that if the whole world is rational (i.e. law-governed and knowable *a priori*), then human nature and society must also be.

Kant's theory of human nature was straightforwardly that of Renaissance Europe. He believed, as Aristotle did, that human beings are essentially rational creatures. He argued that if people were always to act rationally according to their natures, then they would *act only on principles that they could simultaneously will to be universal laws of nature* (which, it should be noted, was Kant's famous 'categorical imperative'). Smith thought likewise thought that morality must ultimately be a matter of rational self-interest, and founded his theory of economics on the market ideal of one attended and serviced only by perfectly well-informed and rationally self-interested agents.

But humans are not just rationally self-interested agents, as Aristotle believed; they are tribal beings, who have both family and tribal loyalties. As every cognitive scientist knows, humans are disposed to take many, not very reliable, short-cuts in their thinking. For human beings to be true to their natures, they must sometimes be disposed to act instinctively, or on their family or tribal values, rather than as rationally self-interested individuals. So a realistic theory of morality, or economics, cannot be founded on the idea that humans are, by nature, rationally self-interested and perfectly well informed. We can pretend to be socially disinterested, perhaps, but ultimately we must find it lonely and inhumane to act only in self-interest.

In *Enlightenment Now* Steven Pinker does not ask for a new enlightenment. He sees the values of the eighteenth century writers, who created the cultural revolution known as the

² Hume is well known for his scepticism about the value of Newton's *Principia* as a theoretical achievement. And, from the point of view elaborated in his theory of human understanding, such an observation concerning the *Principia* would certainly have been fully justified. Who else might he have had in mind?

European Enlightenment, as adequate to have powered the socially progressive policies that have been so productive ever since. He is right about this, as far as it goes, but to progress from where we are, I say, the Western world now needs to change its ways of thinking about theories of morals, economics and politics. These are essentially social and/or psychological theories, not physical ones for which abstract theoretical models of the kind used in geometry and celestial mechanics are appropriate. In addition, given that the most recent scientific revolution is a digital one, which has affected the social world fundamentally, further progress will inevitably require a fundamental re-think of human choices and actions, human nature, and human societies.

4.

If the eighteenth century views of human nature and economics are no longer tenable, what we need now are not *a priori* theories of economics and morality, but pragmatic ones that negotiate the principles and practices that best serve the interests of the people, both generally in the world, and locally at home.

It is not that progress is not possible in a capitalist world. We need a new enlightenment because progress under capitalism has become highly distorted and raw capitalism has become a threat to democratic governance.

To remove these distortions in capitalist development, we need to invent scientifically realistic theories in all of the social sciences, and this is precisely what I have been trying to do for many years. I began by arguing for modern scientific realism³ as a first philosophy (Ellis, 2009) and sought immediately to develop a scientifically realistic theory of social morality to replace Kant's rationalistic one (Ellis, 2012). I also argued for the replacement of neoclassical economics, which is clearly anachronistic. My initial thought was that it should be replaced by Keynes's theory (Ellis, 2017), which proceeds from a much more realistic set of axioms than any of the earlier axiomatic theories, as Paul Davidson argues. But I now think that even this is not radical enough. What is needed, I now think, is something much more like the system that Steve Keen has been working on, but even more multi-factored. We must not rely on the neoclassical theories that were in use in the years before the Great Depression, nor attempt to change the existing social reality to make it fit the theory, as the neoliberals

³ The modern version of scientific realism differs from the empiricism of the Scottish Enlightenment. So, I would classify Jack Smart's book on *The Philosophy of Scientific Realism* as belonging to the genre of British Empiricism.

evidently want us to do. Rather, we must change our theory to fit the facts, as all good scientific theorists must.

I do not think that many economists consciously adopted the strategy of adapting the society to fit the abstract model, but, in effect, this is what they did. This happened, I believe, because rationalistic theories in the social sciences are always two-faced. When they are read in one way, they are straightforwardly what they purport to be, viz. theories for the *production and management* of social goods and services. But, if you like the theorems of your rationalistic theory better than you do its axioms, you can always use it in reverse, as a theory for *social reconstruction*, rather than as one of social construction. This is impossible in the physical sciences, for the simple reason that you cannot reconstruct reality. But you can do it, or try to do it, in the social sciences, by arguing that if the social structure were more like the theoretical ideal, it would work better. This is why the term '*political economic* theory' came to replace the narrower concept of '*economic* theory'.

The neo-classical economic theory developed by Léon Walras, Alfred Marshall and others was thus a double failure. It failed as a theory for the production and management of goods and services for various kinds of markets. Events like the Great Depression and the Global Financial Crisis were never meant to happen. And when they did happen, it did not tell the managers how to reconstruct the society to ensure that they never happened again. We are still suffering, in fact, from the catastrophic effects of the Global Financial Crisis, as Adam Tooze has so forcefully argued.

Ronald Reagan and his economic advisors were neoliberals, advocating a reverse application of nineteenth century economic rationalism (i.e. the neoclassical theory). Because neoclassical economics has (a) no government within the structure it is dealing with, and (b) was manifestly unsatisfactory as a theory of economics (as Keynes had argued very forcefully), Ronald Reagan argued that the influence of governments upon the economy must be minimised.

In constructing a national economic model, however, one cannot treat the government as being irrelevant, and so external to the system. The government of a country spends money on behalf of all of the people in its domain, pays for nearly all of the goods, infrastructure and services available to the people generally, and is by far its largest employer. Of course, it is part of the system—not an externality – and a new enlightenment would include this in the development of economic theory. Furthermore, the international system of laws, free trade

agreements, national dependencies, and so on, must also be considered to be part of the system. For decisions made in one country can radically change the conditions in another, and affect prices, sales, and employment opportunities everywhere else.

In addition, money was seen by neoclassical economists as being just a convenience and of no value in itself. It does nothing, they thought, other than facilitate the processes of exchange.

But it seems that money means different things to different people. For the poor, it is a necessity of life. But for the rich it is a politically powerful commodity, which, like the magic pudding, is self-reproducing, and capable of transforming the whole nature of the society in which one lives. Money held in quantity is, indeed, *raw economic power*. It is 'raw' in the sense that it is intrinsically undirected. It can be used to do good. Or, it can be used to do great harm. It can be used to survive. Or it can be used for the purposes of domination, insurrection, bribery, propaganda, sabotage, economic warfare, or suppression. And the press barons know this all too well.

The main defence that democratic governments have against these assaults is to deploy the economic powers of government for the purposes of resisting them. On the other hand, if they try too hard to do this, they will be accused of authoritarianism, and some kind of balance is necessary.

I do not know how to do this precisely, and I do not want to abandon either democracy or capitalism. Democracy has, until quite recently, been the principal guarantor of our political and economic freedoms, and hence of most of our human rights. But, insofar as democracy allows individuals and/or corporations to acquire unlimited amounts of raw economic power, it necessarily undermines democracy. In other words, it turns the struggle for social, moral and political rights into a power struggle with the odds heavily favouring the very rich.

The social, moral, economic and cultural rights of humankind are (roughly) those articulated in Articles 22 to 29 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Of these, the social, moral and cultural rights of individuals must be guaranteed by governments. Therefore, governments must have the economic power to provide for them, whether directly or indirectly. If they are not so provided, and there are individuals who cannot provide adequately for themselves and their dependents, then these people will not be able to live, or do so legally and with dignity, in their home countries.

The economic rights of individuals all concern their basic right to live with respect and dignity on the money that they and their dependents are able to earn from their employment, or, in the event that they are unfit to work, or cannot find decent employment, then on the pension or allowance that the society provides. A decent society must be one that requires its government to guarantee these much neglected human rights. And, if there are any countries in the world that are too impoverished to provide such guarantees, then it must be considered the duty of the world body, currently the United Nations, to provide these guarantees for them.

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III

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