The Reducibility of Generalized Modal Syllogisms Based on $\square \text{AM} \diamond \text{I-1}$

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Abstract

There is the reducibility between the generalized modal syllogism $\square \text{AM} \diamond \text{I-1}$ and the other 20 valid generalized modal syllogisms. This paper first proves the validity of the generalized modal syllogism based on the truth value definitions of sentences with quantification, set theory and modal logic, then derives the other 20 valid generalized modal syllogisms from the syllogism $\square \text{AM} \diamond \text{I-1}$ in line with some facts and inference rules. The reason why these syllogisms are reducible is that: (1) any of the Aristotelian quantifiers can be defined by the other three Aristotelian quantifiers; (2) any of the four generalized quantifiers in this paper (that is, most, at most half of the, fewer than half of the and at least half of the) can be defined by the other three generalized quantifiers; (3) the Aristotelian quantifiers some and no have symmetry; (4) a necessary modality $\square$ and a possible modality $\diamond$ can be mutually defined. And the process of these reductions are ultimately presented in a structured formalization way. Thus, this paper provides a fragmentary research approach for other generalized modal syllogisms including four generalized quantifiers with transformation relations. There are many generalized modal syllogisms in natural language. Therefore, this study has practical
significance and theoretical value for knowledge representation and reasoning in artificial intelligence.

**Keywords:** Generalized modal syllogism; Reducibility; Generalized quantifier; Validity

1. Introduction

Syllogistic reasoning is one of the important forms of reasoning in natural language and human thinking. There are various kinds of syllogisms in natural language, such as Aristotelian syllogisms (Hui, 2023), Aristotelian modal syllogisms (Johnson, 2004), generalized syllogisms (Murinová & Novák, 2012; Endrullis et al., 2015), generalized modal syllogisms, and so on. This paper shall restrict attention mainly to the reducibility of generalized modal syllogisms.

There are some studies on the reducibility of syllogisms. Łukasiewic (1957) studied the reducibility between the two Aristotelian syllogisms (AAA-1 and AII-3) and the other 22 valid syllogisms. Long (2023) derived the remaining 23 valid syllogisms only from the valid Aristotelian syllogism AEE-4. Xiaojun (2020) discussed reducible relations between/among Aristotelian modal syllogisms. Cheng (2023a) studied how to deduce the other 91 valid Aristotelian modal syllogisms from the Aristotelian modal syllogism □I□A□I-3. Although there are many generalized modal syllogisms in natural language, there is no literature on the reducibility of this kind of syllogisms up till now. This paper focuses on this topic.

2. Preliminaries

In the paper, let $R$, $S$ and $T$ be the lexical variables in sentences with quantification, and $D$ the domain of lexical variables. The generalized modal syllogisms discussed in this paper contain sentences in the following forms: All $Rs$ are $T$, No $Rs$ are $T$, Some $Rs$ are $T$, Not all $Rs$ are $T$, most $Rs$ are $T$, fewer than half of the $Rs$ are $T$, at most half of the $Rs$ are $T$, and at least half of the $Rs$ are $T$. The eight sentences can be respectively symbolized as $\text{all}(R, T)$, $\text{no}(R, T)$, $\text{some}(R, T)$, $\text{not all}(R, T)$, $\text{most}(R, T)$, $\text{fewer than half of the}(R, T)$, $\text{at most half of the}(R, T)$, and $\text{at least half of the}(R, T)$, and abbreviated as the proposition $A$, $E$, $I$, $O$, $M$, $F$, $H$, and $L$ respectively. $|R|$ stands for the cardinality of the set composed of the variable $R$, $Q$ for any
generalized quantifiers, \( \neg Q \) and \( Q \neg \) for the outer and inner negative quantifier of \( Q \) respectively.

Generalized modal syllogisms refer to the syllogisms that contain modalities (that is, the necessary modality \( \square \) and/or the possible modality \( \Diamond \)) and generalized quantifiers.

Example 1:

Major premise: All peach trees are necessarily flowering plants.

Minor premise: Most trees in this farm are peach trees.

Conclusion: Some trees in this farm are possibly flowering plants.

Let \( R \) be the set of all trees in the domain, \( S \) the set of all peach trees in the domain, and \( T \) the set of all flowering plants in the domain. Then the generalized modal syllogism in Example 1 can be formalized as \( \square all(S, T) \land most(R, S) \rightarrow \Diamond some(R, T) \), and abbreviated as \( \square AM \Diamond I-1 \).

According to the generalized quantifier theory (Peters and Westerståhl, 2006), set theory (Halmos, 1974) and possible world semantics (Chellas, 1980), the truth value definitions of the sentences with quantification as follows (Cheng, 2023b):

Definition 1 (truth value definitions):

1. \( all(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \subseteq T \) is true.
2. \( some(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \cap T \neq \emptyset \) is true.
3. \( no(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \cap T = \emptyset \) is true.
4. \( not all(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \nsubseteq T \) is true.
5. \( most(R, T) \) is true just in case \( |R \cap T| \geq 0.6 \cdot |R| \) is true.
6. \( \square all(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \subseteq T \) is true in any possible world.
7. \( \Diamond all(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \subseteq T \) is true in at least one possible world.
8. \( \square some(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \cap T \neq \emptyset \) is true in any possible world.
9. \( \Diamond some(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \cap T \neq \emptyset \) is true in at least one possible world.
10. \( \square no(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \cap T = \emptyset \) is true in any possible world.
11. \( \Diamond no(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \cap T = \emptyset \) is true in at least one possible world.
12. \( \square not all(R, T) \) is true just in case \( R \nsubseteq T \) is true in any possible world.
(13) ◇ not all(R, T) is true just in case \( R \nsubseteq T \) is true in at least one possible world.

(14) □ most(R, T) is true just in case \( |R \cap T| \geq 0.6 |R| \) is true in any possible world.

(15) ◇ most(R, T) is true just in case \( |R \cap T| \geq 0.6 |R| \) is true in at least one possible world.

Definition 2 (inner negation): \( Q \neg (R, T) =_{df} Q(R, D \neg T) \).

Definition 3 (outer negation): \( \neg Q(R, T) =_{df} \) It is not that \( Q(R, T) \).

Fact 1 (inner negation for Aristotelian quantifiers)

(1) all(R, T) = no \neg (R, T);

(2) no(R, T) = all \neg (R, T);

(3) some(R, T) = not all \neg (R, T);

(4) not all(R, T) = some \neg (R, T);

(5) fewer than half of the(R, T) = most \neg (R, T);

(6) most(R, T) = fewer than half of the \neg (R, T);

(7) at most half of the(R, T) = at least half of the \neg (R, T);

(8) at least half of the(R, T) = at most half of the \neg (R, T).

Fact 1 can be easily proved by Definition 2 (Cheng, 2022).

Fact 2 (outer negation for Aristotelian quantifiers):

(1) \neg not all(R, T) = all(R, T);

(2) \neg all(R, T) = not all(R, T);

(3) \neg no(R, T) = some(R, T);

(4) \neg some(R, T) = no(R, T);

(5) \neg most(R, T) = at most half of the(R, T);

(6) \neg at most half of the(R, T) = most(R, T);

(7) \neg fewer than half of the(R, T) = at least half of the(R, T);

(8) \neg at least half of the(R, T) = fewer than half of the(R, T).

Fact 2 can be easily proved by Definition 3.

A necessary modality □ and a possible modality ◇ are mutually dual. Let \( Q(R, T) \) be a categorical proposition, then \( ◇ Q(R, T) =_{df} \neg □ \neg Q(R, T) \) and \( □ Q(R, T) =_{df} \neg ◇ \neg Q(R, T) \).

Hence, the following Fact 3 can be obtained.

Fact 3: (1) \neg □ Q(R, T) = ◇ \neg Q(R, T); (2) \neg ◇ Q(R, T) = □ \neg Q(R, T).

The following facts are the basic knowledge in classical modal logic (Chagrov and Zakharyaschev, 1997) or generalized quantifier theory (Peters and Westerståhl, 2006). Thus
their proofs are omitted.

Fact 4 (a necessary proposition implies an assertoric proposition): \( \vdash \Box Q(R, T) \rightarrow Q(R, T) \).

Fact 5 (a necessary proposition implies a possible proposition): \( \vdash \Box Q(R, T) \rightarrow \Diamond Q(R, T) \).

Fact 6 (an assertoric proposition implies a possible proposition): \( \vdash Q(R, T) \rightarrow \Diamond Q(R, T) \).

Fact 7 (a universal proposition implies a particular proposition):

(1) \( \vdash all(R, T) \rightarrow some(R, T) \); 
(2) \( \vdash no(R, T) \rightarrow not all(R, T) \).

Fact 8 (symmetry of some and no): (1) \( some(R, T) \leftrightarrow some(T, R) \); (2) \( no(R, T) \leftrightarrow no(T, R) \).

The basic rules in classical propositional logic are suitable for generalized modal syllogistic.

For example, let \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \) and \( \delta \) be proposition variables,

Rule 1 (subsequent weakening): If \( \vdash (\alpha \land \beta \rightarrow \gamma) \) and \( \vdash (\gamma \rightarrow \delta) \), then \( \vdash (\alpha \land \beta \rightarrow \delta) \).

Rule 2 (anti-syllogism): If \( \vdash (\alpha \land \beta \rightarrow \gamma) \), then \( \vdash (\neg \gamma \land \alpha \rightarrow \neg \beta) \) or \( \vdash (\neg \gamma \land \beta \rightarrow \neg \alpha) \).

3. Reduction between the \( \Box AM \Diamond I-1 \) and the Other 20 Valid Generalized Modal Syllogisms

The following Theorem 1 shows that \( \Box AM \Diamond I-1 \) is valid. And ‘\( \Box AM \Diamond I-1 \Rightarrow \Box EM \Diamond O-1 \)’ in the Theorem 2(1) means that the validity of syllogism \( \Box EM \Diamond O-1 \) can be deduced from the validity of syllogism \( \Box AM \Diamond I-1 \). Then one can say that there is reducibility between these two syllogisms. The other cases in the Theorem 2 are similar.

Theorem 1 (\( \Box AM \Diamond I-1 \)): The generalized modal syllogism \( \Box all(S, T) \land most(R, S) \rightarrow \Diamond some(R, T) \) is valid.

Proof: According to Example 1, \( \Box AM \Diamond I-1 \) is the abbreviation of the syllogism \( \Box all(S, T) \land most(R, S) \rightarrow \Diamond some(R, T) \). Suppose that \( \Box all(S, T) \) and \( most(R, S) \) are true. Then in virtue of the clause (6) in Definition 1, \( \Box all(S, T) \) is true just in case \( S \subseteq T \) is true in any possible world. Similarly, in line with the clause (5) in Definition 1, \( most(R, S) \) is true just in case \( |R \cap S| \geq 0.6 \) \( R \) is true. Thus, it is easily seen that \( S \subseteq T \) and \( |R \cap S| \geq 0.6 \) \( R \) are true. It follows that \( |R \cap T| \geq 0.6 \) \( R \), and it is clear that \( R \cap T \neq \emptyset \). Then, on the basis of the clause (2) in Definition 1, \( some(R, T) \) is true. Therefore, \( \Diamond some(R, T) \) comes out true in terms of the Fact 6, just as required.
Theorem 2: The following valid generalized modal syllogisms can be derived from 
\(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\):

(1) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\)

(2) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\text{M}\Box\text{A}\Diamond I-4\)

(3) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-3\)

(4) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{EH}-2\)

(5) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{EH}-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{E}\Diamond H-2\)

(6) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\)

(7) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{E}\Box\text{AH}-2\)

(8) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{E}\Box\text{AH}-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{E}\Box\text{A}\Diamond H-2\)

(9) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-3\)

(10) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\text{M}\Box\text{A}\Diamond I-4\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{EH}-4\)

(11) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\text{M}\Box\text{A}\Diamond I-4\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{EH}-4\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{E}\Diamond H-4\)

(12) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\text{M}\Box\text{A}\Diamond I-4\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-4\)

(13) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\text{M}\Box\text{A}\Diamond I-3\)

(14) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{E}\Box\text{AH}-1\)

(15) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{E}\Box\text{AH}-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{E}\Box\text{A}\Diamond H-1\)

(16) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{AF}\Diamond O-2\)

(17) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{AF}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{AL}-1\)

(18) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{AF}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{AL}-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{A}\Diamond L-1\)

(19) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{EM}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{AF}\Diamond O-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{F}\Box\text{A}\Diamond O-3\)

(20) \(\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{EH}-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{E}\Diamond H-2\Rightarrow\Box\text{A}\Box\text{M}\Diamond I-1\)

Proof:

[1] \(\Box\text{all}(S, T)\land\text{most}(R, S)\rightarrow\Box\text{some}(R, T)\quad\text{(i. e. }\Box\text{AM}\Diamond I-1)\)

[2] \(\Box\text{all}(S, T)\Rightarrow\Box\text{no}(S, T)\quad\text{(by Fact 1(1))}\)

[3] \(\Box\text{some}(R, T)\Rightarrow\Box\text{not all}(R, T)\quad\text{(by Fact 1(3))}\)
[4] ⊢ □no¬(S, T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇ not all¬(R, T)  
(by [1], [2], [3])

[5] ⊢ no¬(S, T) = no(S, D−T)  
(by Definition 2)

[6] ⊢ not all¬(R, T) = not all(R, D−T)  
(by Definition 2)

[7] ⊢ □no(S, D−T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇ not all(R, D−T)  
(i. e. □EM ◇ O-1, by [4], [5], [6])

[8] ⊢ some(R, T) ↔ some(T, R)  
(by Fact 8(1))

[9] ⊢ □all(S, T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇ some(T, R)  
(i. e. M □ A ◇ I-4, by [1] and [8])

[10] ⊢ ¬ ◇ some(R, T) ∧ most(R, S) → □ all(S, T)  
(by [1] and Rule 2)

(by Fact 3(2))

[12] ⊢ ¬ □ all(S, T) = ◇¬ all(S, T)  
(by Fact 3(1))

[13] ⊢ □¬ some(R, T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇¬ all(S, T)  
(by [10], [11], [12])

[14] ⊢ ¬ some(R, T) = no(R, T)  
(by Fact 2(4))

[15] ⊢ ¬ all(S, T) = not all(S, T)  
(by Fact 2(2))

[16] ⊢ □ no(R, T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇ not all(S, T)  
(i. e. □ EM ◇ O-3, by [13], [14], [15])

[17] ⊢ ¬ ◇ some(R, T) ∧ □ all(S, T) → ¬ most(R, S)  
(by [1] and Rule 2)

[18] ⊢ ¬ most(R, S) = at most half of the(R, S)  
(by Fact 2(5), [17])

[19] ⊢ □ no(R, T) ∧ □ all(S, T) → at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □ A □ EH-2, by [11], [14], [17], [18])

[20] ⊢ at most half of the(R, S) → ◇ at most half of the(R, S)  
(by Fact 6)

[21] ⊢ □ no(R, T) ∧ □ all(S, T) → ◇ at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □ A □ E ◇ H-2, by [19], [20] and Rule 1)

[22] ⊢ no(S, D−T) ↔ no(D−T, S)  
(by Fact 8(2))

[23] ⊢ □ no(D−T, S) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇ not all(R, D−T)  
(i. e. □ EM ◇ O-2, by [7], [22])

[24] ⊢ ¬ ◇ not all(R, D−T) ∧ □ no(S, D−T) → most(R, S)  
(by [7] and Rule 2)

[25] ⊢ □¬ not all(R, D−T) ∧ □ no(S, D−T) → most(R, S)  
(by Fact 3(2))

[26] ⊢ □ all(R, D−T) ∧ □ no(S, D−T) → at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □ E □ AH-2, by Fact 2(1), Fact 2(5), [25])

[27] ⊢ □ all(R, D−T) ∧ □ no(S, D−T) → ◇ at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □ E □ A ◇ H-2, by [20], [26] and Rule 1)

[28] ⊢ ¬ ◇ not all(R, D−T) ∧ most(R, S) → □ no(S, D−T)  
(by [7] and Rule 2)
[29] ⊢ □¬all(R, D−T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇¬no(S, D−T)  
(by Fact 3 and [28])

[30] ⊢ □all(R, D−T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇some(S, D−T)  
(i. e. □AM ◈I-3, by Fact 2(1), Fact 2(3), [29])

[31] ⊢ ¬◇some(T, R) ∧ □all(S, T) → ¬most(R, S)  
(by [9] and Rule 2)

[32] ⊢ □¬some(T, R) ∧ □all(S, T) → ¬most(R, S)  
(by Fact 3(2) and [31])

[33] ⊢ □no(T, R) ∧ □all(S, T) → at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □A□EH-4, by Fact 2(4), Fact 2(5), [32])

[34] ⊢ □no(T, R) ∧ □all(S, T) → ◇at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □A□E□H-4, by [20], [33] and Rule 1)

[35] ⊢ ¬◇some(T, R) ∧ most(R, S) → □all(S, T)  
(by [9] and Rule 2)

[36] ⊢ □¬some(T, R) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇¬all(S, T)  
(by Fact 3 and [35])

[37] ⊢ □no(T, R) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇not all(S, T)  
(i. e. □EM ◈O-4, by Fact 2(4), Fact 2(2), [36])

[38] ⊢ ¬◇not all(R, D−T) ∧ most(R, S) → □no(D−T, S)  
(by [23] and Rule 2)

[39] ⊢ □¬not all(R, D−T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇¬no(D−T, S)  
(by Fact 3 and [38])

[40] ⊢ □all(R, D−T) ∧ most(R, S) → ◇some(D−T, S)  
(i. e. M□A ◈I-3, by Fact 2(1), Fact 2(3), [39])

[41] ⊢ ¬◇not all(R, D−T) ∧ □no(D−T, S) → most(R, S)  
(by [23] and Rule 2)

[42] ⊢ □¬not all(R, D−T) ∧ □no(D−T, S) → most(R, S)  
(by Fact 3(2) and [41])

[43] ⊢ □all(R, D−T) ∧ □no(D−T, S) → at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □E□AH-1, by Fact 2(1), Fact 2(5), [42])

[44] ⊢ □all(R, D−T) ∧ □no(D−T, S) → ◇at most half of the(R, S)  
(i. e. □E□A ◈H-1, by [20], [43] and Rule 1)

[45] ⊢ no(D−T, S) = all−(D−T, S)  
(by Fact 1(2))

[46] ⊢ most(R, S) = fewer than half of the−(R, S)  
(by Fact 1(6))

[47] ⊢ □all−(D−T, S) ∧ fewer than half of the−(R, S) → ◇not all(R, D−T)  
(by [23], [45], [46])

[48] ⊢ □all(D−T, D−S) ∧ fewer than half of the(R, D−S) → ◇not all(R, D−T)  
(i. e. □AF ◈O-2, by Definition 2 and [47])
[49] ⊢ ¬◇not all(R, D−T)∧□all(D−T, D−S)→fewer than half of the(R, D−S)

(by [48] and Rule 2)

[50] ⊢ ¬fewer than half of the(R, D−S)→at least half of the(R, D−S)  

(by Fact 2(7))

[51] ⊢ □¬not all(R, D−T)∧□all(D−T, D−S)→at least half of the(R, D−S)

(by Fact 3(2), [49] and [50])

[52] ⊢ □all(R, D−T)∧□all(D−T, D−S)→at least half of the(R, D−S)

(i. e. □A□AL-1, by [51] and Fact 2(1))

[53] ⊢ at least half of the(R, D−S)→◇at least half of the(R, D−S)

(by Fact 5)

[54] ⊢ □all(R, D−T)∧□all(D−T, D−S)→◇at least half of the(R, D−S)

(i. e. □A□A◇L-1, by [52], [53])

[55] ⊢ ¬◇not all(R, D−T)∧fewer than half of the(R, D−S)→□all(D−T, D−S)

(by [48] and Rule 2)

[56] ⊢ □¬not all(R, D−T)∧fewer than half of the(R, D−S)→◇¬all(D−T, D−S)

(by Fact 3, [55])

[57] ⊢ □all(R, D−T)∧fewer than half of the(R, D−S)→◇not all(D−T, D−S)

(i. e. F□A◇O-3, by Fact 2(1), Fact 2(2), [56])

[58] ⊢ ¬◇at most half of the(R, S)∧□all(S, T)→¬◇no(R, T)

(by [21] and Rule 2)

[59] ⊢ □¬at most half of the(R, S)∧□all(S, T)→◇¬no(R, T)

(by Fact 3 and [58])

[60] ⊢ □most(R, S)∧□all(S, T)→◇some(R, T)  

(i. e. □A□M◇I-1, by Fact 2(3), Fact 2(5), [59])

So far, the other 20 generalized modal syllogisms have been deduced from the validity of the syllogism □AM◇I-1 by means of generalized quantifier theory and modern modal logic. This indicates that there is the reducibility between these 21 syllogisms.

4. Conclusion

The research in this paper illustrates that there is the reducibility between the generalized modal syllogism □ AM ◇ I-1 and the other 20 valid generalized modal syllogisms. Specifically, this paper first proves the validity of the generalized modal syllogism □AM◇I-1 based on the truth value definitions of sentences with quantification, set theory and modal logic, and then derives the other 20 valid generalized modal syllogisms from the syllogism □AM◇I-1 in line with some facts and inference rules. And the entire process of
proof is ultimately presented in a structured formalization way. The reason why these syllogisms are reducible is that: (1) any of the Aristotelian quantifiers can be defined by the other three Aristotelian quantifiers; (2) any of the four generalized quantifiers mentioned in this paper (that is, most, at most half of the, fewer than half of the, and at least half of the) can be defined by the other three generalized quantifiers; (3) the Aristotelian quantifiers some and no have symmetry; (4) a necessary modality □ and a possible modality ◊ can be mutually defined. Just for the above reasons, more valid generalized modal syllogisms can be also derived from □AM◊I-1.

This paper inspires us to simplify the study of other generalized modal syllogisms through a fragmentary research approach. That is to say, by making most of the transformation relations of the four generalized quantifiers (such as at most 1/3 of the, most than 1/3 of the, at least 2/3 of the, less than 2/3 of the) and that of the necessary modality □ and the possible modality ◊, one can not only show the reducibility of corresponding valid generalized modal syllogisms, but also discuss the soundness and completeness for the fragment of generalized modal syllogistic. There are many generalized modal syllogisms in natural language. Therefore, this study has practical significance and theoretical value for knowledge representation and reasoning in artificial intelligence.

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Reference


