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The Nurturing of Immoral Executives: ‘Jumpers’ Covertly Concealed Managerial Ignorance

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Abstract

‘Jumping’ between firms causes job-knowledge gaps that encourage use of covertly concealed managerial ignorance (hereafter CCMI), defending authority by either detachment and/or autocratic seduction-coercion. CCMI use causes distrust and ignorance cycles, which engender mismanagement that bars performance-based promotion and encourages immoral careerism (Im-C). Such careerism is a known managerial malady, but explaining its emergence proved challenging as managerial ignorance is often concealed as a dark secret on organizations’ dark side by conspiracies of silence. A 5-year semi-native anthropological study of five ‘jumper’-managed automatic processing plants and their parent inter-kibbutz co-operatives found a positive correlation between ‘jumper’ statuses, experience of ‘jumps’ and practicing CCMI and Im-C. ‘Jumpers’ large knowledge gaps deter ignorance exposure, encourage CCMI and together with related factors generate Im-C. These findings suggest that ‘jumping’ careers tend to nurture immoral executives. Remedies for this corporate malady are suggested, as well as further study of ‘jumping’ and CCMI and Im-C.

Keywords: ‘Jumping’ career advance, covertly concealed managerial ignorance, immoral

careerism, managerial vulnerable involvement, distrust and ignorance cycles.

Introduction

In view of the business scandals in the last decade, managerial ethics has become a major topic of organizational research but this is not true of immoral careerism (hereafter: Im-C) that uses unethical means. For example, in the 58 Sage management and organization studies journals there are 966 article abstracts that contain the word ‘career’ but only 5 contain either ‘careerism’ or ‘careerist’, though already Riesman (1950) decried managers’ transition from high-moral serving the social good to immoral pursuing private ends and many others concur (Bratton and Kacmar, 2004; Diefenbach, 2013; Feldman and Weitz, 1991; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gini, 1998; Jackall, 1988; Shapira, 2015b; Starbuck, 2007; Vilette and Vuillermot, 2009).

Many managers advanced their careers by changing firms with a fake façade (Goffman, 1959) of successful functioning in previous jobs utilizing immoral means: bluffing, camouflaging, power abusing and scapegoating others for one’s mistakes, failures and wrongs (Boddy et al., 2010; Dalton, 1959; Hughes, 1958; Jackall, 1988; Wexler, 2006), while appropriating to oneself others’ successes (Mehri, 2005: 142; Shapira, 1987: 95). ‘Jumpers’ are common: 58% of US executives were ‘jumpers’ (Campbell et al., 1995), as were 33% of CEOs in the 500 S&P firms (Bower, 2007). However, organizational knowledge and management learning research missed a crucial question: Which practices do ‘jumpers’ use as they face ignorance of job-essential tacit knowledge of their new job, which subordinates have (Fine, 2012; Orr, 1996)?

‘Jumpers’ suffer large knowledge gaps (Bower, 2007); to overcome gaps they need to learn local tacit know-how and *phronesis* (Greek for practical wisdom; Flyvbjerg, 2006) by vulnerable involvement in locals’ deliberations, exposing ignorance and gaining locals’ trust and will to share knowledge (Bennis, 1989: 17; Orr, 1996; Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014: 377; Zand, 1972). However, ignorance exposure diminishes authority, which may be regained only if learning succeeds (Blau, 1955). Due to large knowledge gaps, ‘jumpers’ often see little prospect for learning, avoid ignorance exposure and use covertly concealed managerial ignorance (CCMI for short) by the immoral means cited. This is a dark secret, i.e., its very existence is secret (Goffman, 1959), veiled on organizations’ dark side by conspiracies of silence (Griffin and O’Leary-Kelly, 2004; Hogan and Hogan, 2001; Linstead et al., 2014). Only few studied managerial ignorance but these few found it common (Gannon, 1983;

Hogan and Hogan, 2001; Roberts, 2013; Shapira, 2015b; Smithson, 1989; Zbaracki, 1998). Studies of managerial effectiveness concur: Ineffective managers advanced careers more than effective ones (Luthans, 1988) and among Gallup-studied 80,000 managers only a few were effective (Buckingham and Coffman, 1999). Anthropologists depicted managers' ignorance of employees' know-how and *phronesis* (Burawoy, 1979; Collinson, 2005; Dalton, 1959; Gouldner, 1954; O'Mahoney, 2005; Orr, 1996; Mehri, 2005), but rarely studied how managers handle this ignorance (Roberts, 2013). However, they exposed many immoral subterfuges used by managers (*ibid*; Boddy et al., 2010; Diefenbach, 2013; Johnson, 2008, 2009; Wexler, 2006), suggesting defence of authority, jobs and careers by CCMI (Shapira, 1987, 2015b).

'Jumpers' usually lack locals' language (Collins, 2011), knowledge of their problem-solving (Fine, 2012), sensitivity to the unique contours of circumstances (Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014) and the *phronesis* of 'what to do and how to do it, at the right time and with the right people, ...when to use which skills, and who should perform the actions needed' (Schweigert, 2007: 339-40); they lack '[p]ractical wisdom ...emerging developmentally within an unceasing flow of activities, in which practitioners are inextricably immersed' (Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014: 377; also: Orr, 1996; Zand, 1972). However, managerial power lets them avoid immersion and use CCMI instead, by detachment or seductive-coercive involvement, bolstering their authority and prestige through the abuse of power, petty tyranny, downward mobbing and other immoral means, which are 'much more widespread than usually recognized or acknowledged' (Diefenbach, 2013: 150; also: Boddy et al., 2010; Shapira, 1987, 2013). The use of CCMI leads 'jumpers' to practice Im-C by shuttering performance-based career advance (Shapira, 2015b).


The above begs major questions: Does career advancement by 'jumping' encourage practicing CCMI and Im-C? Can the pitfalls of 'jumping' careers and their ubiquitousness help explain the prevalence of scandalous executives? If so, how might this situation change?

Literature Review and a Theory

Managerial morality and ethics became a major research topic after Enron, Worldcom and other such scandals (Ailon, 2015; Boddy et al., 2010; Diefenbach, 2013; Johnson, 2009; Villette and Vuillermot, 2009; Wexler, 2006), but the research missed the possibility that executives' immorality might have stemmed from using CCMI in 'jumping' careers. The etiological connection between 'jumping', using CCMI, resulting incompetence and practicing Im-C was missed as managers are mostly unaware of their own ignorance (Kruger

and Dunning, 1999) and they can use authority and power to conceal ignorance by either detachment from practitioners' deliberations and/or seductive-coercive autocracy that suppresses employees' voice (Fast et al., 2014; Shapira, 1987, 2015a). These CCMI users' strategies engender distrust that shuts knowledge sharing and diminishes learning and problem-solving; as trust and distrust are reciprocal and create either ascending or descending spirals (Fox, 1974), CCMI use generates vicious cycles of descending trust, employee suspicion, secrecy, ignorance preservation, ineffectiveness, mistaken decisions and failures that further vicious distrust and ignorance cycles (O'Mahoney, 2005; Mehri, 2005; Shapira, 1987, 2013, 2015a); 'jumpers' use of CCMI keeps them incompetent in the absence of knowledge sharing by locals (Bennis, 1989: 17; Gouldner, 1954; Johnson, 2008; Shapira, 1995b, 2013).

Knowledge sharing achieves an open dialogue between and within echelons (Raelin, 2013) in opposite high-trust, innovation-prone cultures called 'organic' by Burns and Stalker (1961; e.g., Dore, 1973; O'Toole, 1999; Ouchi, 1981; Semler, 1993; Shapira, 2012a). In such cultures managers solve problems by ignorance-exposing vulnerable involvement (Zand, 1972). Through virtuous trust and learning cycles they learn practitioners' language (Collins, 2011), gain interactional expertise (Collins and Evans, 2007), use their own referred expertises (Collins and Sandberg, 2007), and through openness to employees' contributions they enhance employees intrinsic motivation, self-determination and wilful cooperation, resulting in high-performing trustful cultures (Bennis, 1989; O'Toole, 1999; Semler, 1993; Shapira, 2015b; Weibel, 2007). The contrary processes can be summarized, thus:



<p>Successes further the above process; managers gain expertises, become competent and enhance innovation ↓</p>	<p>The above furthers secrecy and learning inhibition; executives' job-incompetence furthers failures that encourages conservatism ↓</p>
<p>The resulting innovation-prone high-trust culture enhances learning from innovation mistakes, furthering executives learning and encouraging more involvement</p>	<p>Conservatism spares some mistakes but secrecy causes others and minimal learning from them, repeating them and brain-drain, which furthers CCMI-engendered cycle with above maladies</p>

High-trust cultures were common in early-day Israeli kibbutzim (pl. of kibbutz), but often disappeared with their growth, success and oligarchization (Kressel, 1974; Near, 1997; Shapira, 2001, 2005, 2008; Stryjan, 1989) much as in other successful communes (Brumann, 2000). But unlike these communes, the 269 kibbutzim established hundreds of inter-kibbutz organizations (hereafter: I-KOs), which together with the kibbutzim created a huge social field (Bourdieu, 1977; Lewin, 1951) of some 150,000 people. Like corporate 'jumpers', kibbutz members called *pe'ilim* (meaning activists; singular: *pa'il*) 'jumped' from managing kibbutzim to managing I-KOs, including I-KRCs (Inter-Kibbutz Regional Cooperatives), while some advanced to head national parties, major monopolies, become Knesset (parliament) members and cabinet ministers; even without differential remuneration I-KO jobs steeply stratified *pe'ilim* (Shapira, 2005). Initially, as managers of kibbutzim, *pe'ilim* were mostly high-moral democratic leaders, but with the field's oligarchization sponsored mobility became dominant (Shapira, 2001, 2008; e.g., Dalton, 1959; Levenson, 1961) and I-KO CEOs 'parachuted' (as import of 'jumpers' is called in Israel) *pe'ilim* to I-KO jobs based on loyalty rather than competence; *pe'ilim* often opted for CCMI-Im-C rather than vulnerable involvement due to several factors:

1. *Pe'ilim* suffered knowledge gaps and deficient pertinent expertises, which curbed the psychological safety required for ignorance exposure (Shapira, 1995b).
2. The kibbutz norm of *rotatzia* limited managerial tenures to a few years, hence many ex-kibbutz managers sought 'jumps' to lucrative I-KO jobs, encouraging CEOs to replace subordinate *pe'ilim* with their own loyalists or prospective ones, ostensibly as *rotatzia*; jeopardizing their authority by ignorance exposure in order to learn a short-term job seemed to many *pe'ilim* superfluous and they sought other I-KO jobs (Shapira, 1987, 2005, 2008).
3. CEOs made do with mediocre management, as most I-KOs did not compete in the markets,

while if a CCMI-user ‘jumper’ failed the CEO ‘parachuted’ a rescuer successor *pa’il* who used kibbutz-habituated virtuous trust and learning cycles (Shapira, 2012a).

4. Contextualization further explains the prevalence of CCMI-Im-C: The formally democratic and egalitarian kibbutz field was actually autocratic and oligarchic; I-KO CEOs who proved loyalty to dominant old guard prime kibbutz leaders enjoyed their auspices and retained their jobs for dozens of years (Shapira, 2015b).

Both rulers’ histories and recent business scandals point to prevalent immorality among higher-ups (Gini, 1998; Jackall, 1988; Kanter, 1977; Piff et al., 2012). Higher positions grant more power and authority that is helpful for practicing CCMI-Im-C; ‘The greater the leader’s power, the greater the potential for abuse’ (Johnson, 2009: 9; also: Hughes, 1958; Jackall, 1988; Kanter, 1977; Mehri, 2005). Powerful executives choose when and to whom to expose their ignorance in order to gain job-essential knowledge (Blau, 1955; Grove, 1996: 144), unlike weaker mid-levellers whose problem-solving efforts may expose ignorance to everyone (Shapira, 1987). Career advancement strategies may vary by rank: executives who enjoy sponsored mobility (Levenson, 1961) by an ‘upward looking posture’ (Presthus, 1964) are tuned to patrons’ wishes (Geneen, 1984: 78; Shapira, 2008), while mid-levellers who ‘jump’ due to performance may seek to do similarly in their new jobs by the opposite posture, i.e., dialogic learning and problem-solving through vulnerable involvement that generate trust and learning cycles (Raelin, 2013; Shapira, 2013; Zand, 1972). Also, executives’ problems are more intangible with more hard-to-assess factors and causal relationships, seemingly making it easier to practice CCMI-Im-C, versus mid-levellers’ tangible problems that make it harder to conceal ignorance (Shapira, In print).

Mid-level *pe’ilim* were mostly first-time jumpers, versus the multiple ‘jumpings’ of many executives; the latter’s career success by ‘jumpings’ may explain their tendency to CCMI-Im-C. Ethnographies may single out the impact of ‘jumping’/‘parachuting’ on CCMI-Im-C and nurturing immoral executives. The following questions are studied:

1. Did mid-levellers’ career advancement strategies contrast with those of executives, and if so – why?
2. Did the immorality of prime kibbutz leaders cascade to all managerial echelons (e.g., Jackall, 1988: 95) or only to executives, and if so – why?
3. Do the findings support the hypothesis that ‘jumping’/‘parachuting’ careers encourage CCMI-Im-C and nurture immoral executives?

4. How can answers to these questions help mitigate ‘jumper’ executives’ immorality?

The paper has six sections:

1. Longitudinal semi-native multi-site ethnography: Method and cases
2. Opting for CCMI-Im-C and managerial echelons’ tenures
3. Promotion prospects, contrary involvement choices and managerial morality
4. ‘Upward looking posture’ encouraged CCMI-Im-C, downward gaze fitted high-moral trustful vulnerable involvement
5. Prevalent use of CCMI nurtured Im-C practicing ‘parachuted’ executives
6. Conclusions, plausible solutions and further research

1. Method: Longitudinal Semi-Native Multi-Site Ethnography

Anthropologists have rarely studied executives (Welker et al., 2011) as they face a major barrier: they cannot be executives to heed the advice of sages of old: ‘don’t judge others until you have stood in their shoes’; field-work as an employee (Mehri, 2005) or an observer-interviewer (Dalton, 1959) cannot achieve this. I overcame this barrier by a unique semi-native longitudinal anthropology: A native anthropologist studies his/her own people and, being too close to them, may adopt their biased or particularistic views (Narayan, 1993), while outsider ethnographers suffer naivety, miss/misunderstand locals’ views, and/or other crucial insider knowledge (Gioia et al., 2013: 19). I avoided both by studying five automatic cotton gin plants and their parent I-KRCs (Inter-Kibbutz Regional Cooperatives; e.g., Nilsson et al., 2009), each owned by dozens of kibbutzim and managed by ‘jumper’ *pe’ilim* who were ex-managers of kibbutzim or I-KOs. Like them I was a kibbutz member, had a college managerial and anthropological education and had experienced for 18 years work and management at my kibbutz’s automatic processing plant, hence enjoying referred expertise i.e., expertise in other action domains that facilitates learning (Collins and Sanders, 2007); I knew some *pe’ilim* even before the study, as well as the kibbutz context that socialized them; usually organizational ethnographers lacked such knowledge (Yanow, 2004).

Due to all these I approached *pe’ilim* as their peer, we discussed common problems, and I gained access to their documents. I aimed at thick description (Geertz, 1973) for valid interpretation of my data; as coping with the problems of plants’ uncertainty domains, such as

the changing characteristics of raw cotton, was learned exclusively on-the-job, I held mini-seminars with nationally renowned veteran ginning experts, learned these problems, and acquired considerable ‘know-that’ before learning the ginning ‘know-how’ (Brown, 2001) by participant observation.

For five years I intermittently observed the focal Merkaz high-capacity automatic cotton gin plant (a pseudonym, as are all names hereafter) and its I-KRC’s industrial park, holding casual talks and lengthy open interviews with 168 current and former staff members plus 24 executives of its parent I-KRC and other plants, both *pe’ilim* and hired employees, some of them more than once. Participant observation I made as a registrar, working shifts in the high season when plant operated non-stop 24/7. Then I toured four other gin plants, observed their premises, and interviewed 63 present and past executives and managers. Longitudinal ethnography, with free access to documents, made it possible to check information and assertions, avoiding outsiders’ naivety and managers’ bending of information for image-building. Thick descriptions of managers’ practices let me judge them as if I stood in their shoes. Moreover, I analyzed and re-analyzed my data several times over the last 30 years, returning from aggregate dimensions to first order concepts (Gioia et al., 2013).

The focal Merkaz gin plant was fairly representative of three of the four other gin plants studied; it had two processing units capable of processing 650-700 tons of raw cotton daily during the high season, September-December, but during my participant observation season mismanagement limited Merkaz’s average daily production to some 400 tons. The fourth plant studied, Northern Gin, had one processing unit with a capacity of 300 tons. Merkaz’s permanent staff consisted of 10 *pe’ilim* who were managers and administrators, and 17 hired foremen, technicians and skilled operators, supplemented by some 70 provisional hired workers in the high season. Some 40 kibbutzim with some 12,000 inhabitants owned Merkaz I-KRC that handled much of their agricultural input and output in six plants with some US\$350 million sales (one billion in current prices). It was administered by some, 200 *pe’ilim* and operated by some 650 hired employees.

2. Opting for CCMI-Im-C and Managerial Echelons’ Tenures

Pe’ilim’s formal term of office was five years, in accord with the supposedly egalitarian *rotatzia* (rotation) norm at kibbutzim, but at all I-KRCs studied many *pe’ilim* executives self-perpetuated their jobs despite mismanagement due to practicing CCMI-Im-C legitimized by

prime kibbutz leaders' keeping their positions for half a century (Shapira, 2005, 2008; e.g., Kets De Vries, 1993; Michels, 1959[1915]). Such executives 'parachuted' *pe'ilim* to subordinate jobs according to loyalty, and when loyalists used CCMI-Im-C and failed - rescuer *pe'ilim* who used contrary practices replaced them. Rescuers empowered by successes (Klein, 1998) often overcame ignorant bosses, who suppressed and replaced them with loyalists who often used CCMI and failed, rescuers were called in, and so on. This seesaw prolonged ignorant executives' rule over mediocre functioning I-KRC plants that did not compete in the markets as part of the cooperative supply and marketing system (Shapira, 2015a, 2015b).

Thus, neither executives' career successes nor prolonged tenures were evidence of successful management (Bratton and Kacmar, 2004; Dalton, 1959; Kanter, 1977; Luthans, 1988; Mehri, 2005); both variables positively correlated with loyalty to superiors rather than with performance (Shapira, 2005). Practical engineer Arbiv, a former technical manager (TM) of Northern Gin and a top ginning expert who became an R&D engineer at the US labs of the world's largest ginning equipment producer, described the mismanagement by *pe'ilim*:

'The manager of Coastal Gin who also headed the national Gin Plant Association reached the conclusion that a good technical manager is just a good mechanic and did a bad service to the entire industry. Take Gornitzki from Coastal Gin – he's an excellent mechanic but during his first five years as TM he had no idea about cotton. Fortunately for him, he had two senior shift foremen who did know something about it and saved him... And do you think he knows anything about it today? Did you see how he failed with the automatic sampler he designed and constructed by himself to save US \$20,000 it offered by a known manufacturer?'

Observing this failure and a few others when visiting other plants, clarified the large gap between a good mechanic and a professional TM of high-capacity automatic cotton gin plant. This gap tried to explain another top-level expert based on his twenty years of experience as the head of national cotton fibre grading laboratory, a graduate of a major professional school in Mississippi whose lab's grading decided Israeli cotton fibre bales' market value:

'Only very few people knew the [ginning] trade... At each gin plant there was the administrative [plant] manager who did not last long, a *pa'il* whose circulation decided continuity rather than the gin plant [needs]. This was the worst defect, because until one learns the subject [of ginning]... a plant manager needs at least 5-6 years. The professionals who did the ginning, its changes and innovations were hired mechanics, often good mechanics who knew nothing about cotton – there was a huge gap between [knowing] the technical side

and understanding cotton. The Gin Plant Association provided some training which was minimal, some [professional] Americans were invited to train these technicians, but often the latter did not have enough know-how to overcome the complex problems’.

My data corroborated these portrayals of most plant managers (PMs) as job-ignorant but I explain their ignorance and incompetence differently. The worst defect was opting for CCMI by ‘parachuted’ PMs, which left them incompetent for good due to vicious distrust and ignorance cycles, resulting in mismanagement and encouraging Im-C. But like the two senior shift foremen ‘who did know something about’ ginning and saved TM Gornitzki, vulnerably-involved knowledgeable mid-levellers mostly saved such PMs, who ‘rode’ on the formers’ successes. Mid-levellers rarely overcame all mistakes and failures committed by CCMI user PMs, but mostly achieved mediocre functioning that defended PMs’ jobs and often enabled them to further their managerial careers.

Contextualization of I-KRCs in the kibbutz field further explains *pe’ilim*’s opting for CCMI-Im-C: Autocratic oligarchic old-guard prime leaders allowed violations of kibbutz egalitarian and democratic principles by *pe’ilim*, enhancing their power, prestige and privileges in return for loyalty (Shapira, 2015b). Touring I-KRC plants untangled clear signs of self-serving power elite, contrary to *pe’ilim* executives’ assertions that their prime aim was to advance plants’ effectiveness and efficiency to best serve kibbutzim. Plants’ shop-floors exhibited obliviousness to these goals, rarely did I find signs of genuine interest in declared aims. For example, as against *pe’ilim*’s brand new company, cars fork-lifts were old sluggish models that frequently breakdown. A major explanation was executives’ power by controlling jobs to which managers of owner kibbutzim, who were Directors on I-KRC boards, sought promotion after short *rotatzia* terms inside kibbutzim. Ineffective control of I-KRCs by owner kibbutzim enabled plant enlargements far beyond kibbutz agricultural requirements, exhibiting technological virtuosity by a power elite interested in prestige, power, privileges and prolonged tenures (Shapira, 1978/9, 1987, 2005; e.g., Galbraith, 1971). Likewise lavish amenities: air-conditioned offices and ample company cars which were rare in kibbutzim at the time. Prime old guard leaders promoted loyalist I-KRC CEOs to top-level national offices (Arad, 1995; Tzimkhi, 1999), enhancing the dominance of sponsored mobility in the kibbutz field (Shapira, 2001, 2008, 2015b; e.g., Levenson, 1961).

Due to power positions, all 10 I-KRC CEOs studied retained their jobs beyond the *rotatzia* terms, 8 of them prolonged their tenures by practicing detached CCMI-Im-C, and only 2 CEOs continued in their jobs due to successes achieved by virtuous trust and learning cycles

due to vulnerable involvement. Among PMs, a tiny percentage of 4.5% (1 of 22), Gabi of Northern Gin, prolonged his tenure to 7.5 years by success in his job through vulnerable involvement (Shapira, 2015b: 1510; below), while 3 PMs (13.6%) who did likewise but succeeded less were replaced at the term's end ostensibly as *rotatzia* but apparently due to loyalist insertions by CEOs. Three mediocre PMs (13.6%) prolonged their tenures for 10-17 years using CCMI and 2 of them also practiced Im-C, while 12 CCMI-Im-C practicing mediocre or unsuccessful PMs (54.8%) continued formal terms or even less (data on 3 seemingly mediocre new PMs [13.6%] is inconclusive).

PMs mostly followed CEOs' morality, including the 4 vulnerably involved PMs who followed high-moral CEOs, but these were not rewarded by promotion, 3 Im-C loyalist CCMI user PMs (13.6%) were promoted due to CEOs' patronage despite mediocre job-functioning. Lacking patronage, 6 other mediocre PMs who could have expected promotion like these 3, were not promoted while 9 other PMs were non-promotable (too old, failed in jobs or were greenhorns); in accord with sponsored mobility dominance of the field no PM was promoted without patronage (Shapira, 2005, 2008), as in the corporate world (Dalton, 1959; Kanter, 1977; Mehri, 2005). However unlike this world, fellow kibbutz members expected *pe'ilim* to abide by the *rotatzia* norm, as they mostly did. The prime reason was that after a while in a kibbutz job an *ex-pa'il* would legitimately 'jump' to another I-KO job, so that *rotatzia* mostly became circulation among managerial jobs, explaining *pe'ilim*'s readiness to leave their jobs (Helman, 1987; Shapira, 1995a). But, expecting short terms many *pe'ilim* did not jeopardize their authority by ignorance exposure and practiced CCMI-Im-C (Shapira, 2015b).

3. Promotion Prospects, Contrary Involvement Choices and Managerial Morality

Circulation was common among executives but less so among mid-level *pe'ilim* who often had to return to humble kibbutz jobs without I-KRC perks. Until the mid-1980s, the period studied, the prosperous kibbutz field offered many managerial jobs for executives' circulation (Near, 1997; Shapira, 2005, 2011; Tzimkhi, 1999). CCMI-Im-C practicing PMs 'rode' on mid-levelers' successes, generated positive images and circulated under the patronage of higher-ups. Mid-levelers, on the other hand, often lacked patronage for circulation as they advanced by performance and for other reasons explained below, while they often could not return to previous kibbutz jobs occupied by successors (Shapira, 2001, 2008).

Thus, mid-leellers rarely circulated; they either continued beyond the *rotatzia* terms for up to 21 years (53.3%, 8 of 15) or returned to kibbutz mid-level jobs after a term (20%, 3). Two *pe'ilim* (13.4%) were deputy PMs for 1.5 and 2 years before succeeding elderly PMs, 1 *pa'il* (6.7%) failed, was fired and left the kibbutz, and 1 *pa'il* (6.7%) was promoted after a formal term to an executive job in a national monopoly. Much as British executives never promoted chief engineers to executive positions (Armstrong, 1987), I-KRC CEOs never promoted successful mid-leellers to PMs, always 'parachuted' loyalists or prospective loyalists, and none of the successful PMs was promoted to CEO; all 10 CEOs studied were 'parachutists' and 10 'parachutists' succeeded them.

Students from Gouldner (1954) onward pointed out that executives elevated/imported their own kind to subordinate managerial jobs, a practice designated 'managerial homosexual reproduction' (Moore, 1962: 109), which Kanter (1977: 48) explained as a result of the built-in uncertainty in managerial jobs. By elevating/importing one's kind the executive expects that subordinate managers will think, decide and act as s/he would have done in these offices and will support his policies and decisions, curbing one's uncertainty and enhancing one's power, an additional certainty (Subsequently I'll use the masculine form since all executives and managers studied were male).

'Parachuted' I-KRC CEOs suffered large knowledge gaps (e.g., Bower, 2007; Nienaber et al., 2015); seeking certainty of knowledge (e.g., Bennis, 1989) they had at best a few loyal insiders to inform them. To obtain certainty they 'parachuted' relatives, *ex-pe'ilim* and *ex-kibbutz* managers whom they met in previous managerial jobs to PM positions. PMs were I-KRC Board members, and their 'parachuting' promised more loyalty and support than promoting unfamiliar successful insiders (unsuccessful ones were not an option); the latter were empowered by successes (Klein, 1998) and by local ties, while gaining their trust and loyalty required risky ignorance-exposing vulnerable involvement. Importing loyalists and gaining the loyalty of importees who were seemingly of one's kind spared such risks and was easier to control as importees were weaker, more dependent on the CEO's backing, lacked local ties and had scanty local knowledge, while their jobs depended on the importing CEO who could easily replace them on *rotatzia* grounds (as kibbutz members they were not given severance payments). Replacing a successful insider-promoted PM who opposed the CEO on major I-KRC Board's decisions was much more hazardous; such a PM enjoyed the loyalty and support of the staff, which might have caused grave problems (e.g., Gouldner, 1954, 1955); he could have revealed to the Board the CCMi of the CEO in critical debates and

defeated his motions. The no-insiders-promotion pattern was a self-serving authority-defense measure of CCMI-Im-C practicing CEOs.

For instance, Merkaz Gin's PM Moav (aged 61 when taking charge) practiced detached CCMI, while his deputies, *pe'ilim* Yaakov and Aharon, became experts by virtuous trust and learning cycles through ignorance-exposing involvement, and successfully managed most operational domains. The veteran stores manager nostalgically remembered: 'Yaakov modelled committed leadership so convincingly that you could not but follow him'. Moav just 'rode' on their successes. When Moav finished a five-year formal term and passed retirement age (65), Yaakov and Aharon demanded from CEO Akerman his succession by Yaakov. Akerman admitted: 'Yaakov was Moav's natural successor, he enjoyed the full trust of all those involved with the plant, which is of prime importance in this job', but refused to explain why the 'natural successor' did not succeed. This was self-serving decision: Moav was his staunch supporter, as a member of the I-KRC Board he was entirely at the CEO's beck and call, could be replaced at any moment, ensuring his yes-saying while Yaakov was empowered by the plant's success (Klein, 1998).

Frustrated Aharon and Yaakov left within two years, and a year later young *pa'il* Yuval (aged 30) from Akerman's kibbutz was 'parachuted' in as deputy PM, though ignorant of ginning and with minimal managerial experience. As Yuval required prolonged grooming for the PM job, his import also served Akerman and Moav, deferring Moav's replacement for another two years. Moav prolonged his tenure by 5 years and Akerman enjoyed a yes-sayer on the I-KRC Board who was replaced by a familiar weak young 'jumper' loyalist.

Akerman's immorality cascaded to his protégé PM Yuval, who opted for autocratic coercive CCMI-Im-C; enjoying the CEO's backing, Yuval often reached decisions without listening to experts or overruled them arbitrarily. In one such wrong decision to replace the electricity system by an imported failing one, he caused damages of US \$1,800,000 (in current prices) and departure of the talented objecting chief electrician. Likewise, other senior experts also left due to his stupid autocracy. Senior technician and foreman Amram:

'Yuval entered the plant with too much brutal force; this was a major reason for my departure. He was the opposite of Yaakov; if some piston dysfunctioned – he went and tried to fix it [himself] with no consideration of experts; he never consulted them and after I left the staff rebelled against Yuval's excessive involvement in their work'.

Other self-servers were Akerman's predecessor CEO, who nominated Moav as PM despite

minimal referred and pertinent expertises due to their family relations, and his successor Zelikovich who imported as PM his ex-kibbutz economic manager Shavit who also lacked such expertises. Previously, Zelikovich's immorality emphasized the fact that he did nothing all season long concerning married PM Yuval's vicious romance with his young female secretary, about which everyone talked. In the 24/7 operating plant these two would frequently disappear for half a day to an unknown destination, with no way of contacting Yuval, although urgent major decisions were sometimes necessary; Zelikovich ousted Yuval on the pretext of *rotatzia* only months later.

Indeed, in 17 of the 22 (77.3%) gin PM nominations studied, the nominating CEOs had a prior acquaintance with the nominees as I-KO colleagues or role-partners, or/and as fellow members of kibbutzim, as their representatives in I-KRC Boards of Directors or/and as relatives (in 5 cases the data was inconclusive). Only 4 PMs (18.2 %) were nominated by high-moral vulnerably involved CEOs with no prior acquaintance due to their excelling in previous jobs or their prospective excelling, as was Northern Gin's PM-2 Gabi.

Gabi had a practical engineering education and a variety of kibbutz managerial experience; but as deputy to an older member charged with establishing a new plant he realized that the plant's concept and proposed process and equipment offered by outsider consultants were fraudulent and bound to fail. He tried to convince his boss and kibbutz managers of this and proposed alternative experts but to no avail. They grasped him as a troublemaker and urged him to leave for a job in Northern I-KRC. Northern I-KRC CEO-1 was a high-moral non-careerist as indicated, for instance, by his humble car; he was sufficiently involved in the gin plant's deliberations to discern that, despite 4.5 years of vulnerable involvement, PM-1 would not achieve more than mediocre results. Seeking a successor, the CEO found the right one – Gabi, whom everyone but his kibbutz bosses praised for his high-moral seeking of the truth and performance in previous managerial jobs. Gabi proved an excellent PM; his transformational leadership (Burns, 1978; Graham, 1991) led Northern to excel on all performance measures. Israel's other gin PMs acknowledged Gabi's excelling and chose him as their Association head, while dozens of interviewees praised his high-moral innovativeness (e.g., Guest, 1962; Karaevli, 2007; Washburn, 2011).

Northern I-KRC's first and second CEOs were vulnerably involved knowledgeable leaders who nominated Gabi and two other high-moral, vulnerably involved PMs who made Northern the best Israeli gin plant for some 15 years. Moreover, this championing of the ginning industry was achieved despite two years of a failed 3rd PM, whose mismanagement the high-

moral 4th PM only partially managed to repair. The exceptional effective management of Northern Gin emphasized the mediocre mismanagement of most CCMI-Im-C practicing PMs and CEOs. Many of them had experienced earlier ‘jumps’ and there are some indications that they reached these jobs due to previous Im-C and patronage; the majority that practiced Im-C suggests that immorality cascaded from kibbutz old guard prime leaders to CEOs and then to PMs (e.g., Jackall, 1988: 95).

However, executives’ immorality rarely cascaded to mid-level *pe’ilim*; 73% (11 of 15) succeeded in jobs by vulnerable involvement, only 27% (4) opted for CCMI-Im-C and of these 4, 2 were short-term deputy PMs groomed for 1.5 and 2 years respectively to replace elderly PMs. Most others, 69% (9 of 13), prolonged their tenures for up to 15 years, and 8 of these 9 did so by success in jobs due to vulnerably involved trust and learning cycles; only one mid-level *pa’il* prolonged his tenure by practicing CCMI-Im-C. The number of mid-level cases is small both due to prolonged tenures and because hired employees mostly occupied these positions (18 of them were interviewed). Expecting continuity rather than *rotatzia*, they were mostly vulnerably involved but excessive tenures generated some distrusted immoral dysfunctional autocrats. For example, on his eighth year in the job the hired TM of Lowland Gin, whose PM was mostly absent (below), came to work at around 15.30, just before workers left for home, ordering the next day’s tasks which he barely supervised.

Executives’ immorality rarely cascaded to mid-level *pe’ilim inter alia* because the latter advanced by performing as kibbutz managers through trust-creating vulnerable involvement and modeling high-moral transformational leadership, as they had only few formal sanctions at their disposal (Rosner, 1993; Shapira, 2008); they mostly repeated this in I-KRC jobs. For instance, Merkaz’s certified practical engineer TM Thomas, a kibbutz garage manager, was a proficient mechanic of agricultural machinery for whom professional competence was a way of being (e.g., Sandberg and Pinnington, 2009). The working clothes of Thomas’s assistant Avi, his detached failing predecessor (see below), were always clean since he never dismantled or reassembled a dirty, oiled machine himself; Thomas’s dirty blue overalls signaled a TM who managed machinery operation and repairs and constantly learned them by reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983), approaching the hard facts to prevent ‘the corruption of information by the hierarchy, the incurable disease of big organizations’ (Boulding, 1968: IX). Avi’s CCMI-Im-C and ‘upward looking posture’ (Prethus, 1964) was tuned to PM Shavit’s expectations, while Thomas succeeded by a downward gaze at subordinates’ functioning, dialogically enhancing their and his own expertise and problem-solving (Baralou and Tsoukas,

2015; Ingvaldsen et al., 2013; Raelin, 2011) as he did previously in the high-trust culture of the kibbutz garage (e.g., Dore, 1973; Ouchi, 1981); he became a prestigious ginner in Israel and abroad (Shapira, 1987, 2012a, 2013).

Thomas and most other successful mid-level *pe'ilim* were not promoted, nor did they 'jump' to similar or higher I-KO jobs as executives mostly did. As first-time *pe'ilim* they knew little about I-KOs' 'jumping' and the ties and patronage needed, this was mostly their first encounter with superiors' CCMI-Im-C subterfuges that were rarer in the kibbutz branch management from which they came (Shapira, 2001, 2008). Executives, in contrast, already experienced 'jumping' and practicing CCMI-Im-C, knew the tacit rules of I-KOs' sponsored mobility and used them to defend their jobs and advance careers (Shapira, 2015a, 2015b).

4. 'Upward Looking Posture' Encouraged CCMI-Im-C, Downward Gaze Fitted High-Moral Trustful Vulnerable Involvement

Ethnographic data further explain the strategy contrast between most PMs and most mid-levelers. PMs mostly preferred an 'upward looking posture' as they gained the job through CEOs' patronage that also promised future promotion. This 'posture' deterred the risking of authority by ignorance-exposing vulnerable involvement, especially if like PM Moav one achieved mediocre plant functioning without it, 'riding' on mid-levelers' successes while a cost-plus pricing system of cotton growers' payments ensured the plant's profitability even with such functioning (Shapira, 1987). Mid-levelers only minimally communicated with such bosses, who could not help job-functioning (Shapira, 2015a: 19-22), nor did they expect helpful decisions by plant Boards. Deputy PM Yaakov described Merkaz's Board of Directors in Moav's era:

'In the [gin plant] Board there were a variety of people who may have had skills in various domains but no professional know-how [of ginning]. Only two of us were capable of making professional decisions - myself and Aharon. When Aharon left I felt I was only disruptive and could not change anything even though I had an understanding of almost everything and no one could sell me any old wives' tales... I knew every machine and all about the [cotton] business, but who else understood these? One can sell anyone any old wives' tale over there and the people are too embarrassed to ask questions so as not to reveal their ignorance. How come they're on the Board and don't understand a thing?' (e.g., Peter and Hull, 1969).

Veteran foreman and top expert ginner Nekhas deplored PM Shavit's stupid communication

thus:

‘Every morning Shavit would drop into [the control room], asking how many bales we produced that night, never asking the more important questions: what fibre quality did we produce or how much cotton did we burn [by negligence]’.

Merkaz’s deputy PM Danton also minimized communication with PM Shavit, preferring conversations with TM Thomas and hired foremen and operators, and harshly criticized Shavit:

‘Shavit is a wizard of numbers who can prove everything using them but knows nothing about the things that create these numbers’.

Since subordinates only minimally communicated with them, such detached PMs did not know how critical the formers were of their ignorance. Lacking such knowledge, executives were ignorant of their own ignorance (Kruger and Dunning, 1999), and falsely believed that they were knowledgeable and functioning reasonably in their jobs. For instance, after 10 years in job Lowland Gin autocratic PM Yatzek asserted stupidly that a gin plant is

‘only some bolts, metal sheets and bearings; since I knew what a bearing is, I was born on a tractor and my harvester combine never stopped working because I could always find a bolt or an iron wire to repair it’.

No knowledgeable ginner would accept this claim; dozens of ginning experts interviewed thought like the ex-head of the national cotton fibre grading laboratory that ‘until one learns the subject [of ginning]... a plant manager needs at least 5-6 years’; I myself saw how the 5.5-years experienced certified practical engineer Avi and more veteran technicians failed all season long to bring a new automatic sampler to smooth operation though it was mechanically perfect (Shapira, 2015b: 1510). Lowland’s veteran expert garage foreman criticized PM Yatzek thus:

‘The problem here is that good work is not paid for, only talking and image building are paid, ingratiating the boss instead of doing good work. Many incompetents came here and remained who only knew how to drill a hole but pretended to be professional [mechanics]. Yatzek sought and rewarded spies who told him what was going on the shop floor. I refused... and was punished [for my integrity] by Yatzek’.

Interviews with gidders supported this critique, but the ‘jumper’ detached CCMI user CEO of Lowland I-KRC, who allowed Yatzek’s ignorant autocracy, also promoted him to PM of a

larger I-KRC plant, asserting that he had proven himself at the gin plant, although Lowland Gin was on the lower half of the gin plant fibre quality list. Yatzek probably never heard the critique of mid-levellers like the above foreman, while employees' distrust and reluctant obedience justified for him the coercive autocracy (e.g., Diefenbach, 2014; Mehri, 2005; Shapira, 2015a). High-moral job-committed mid-levellers communicated upward only with trusted knowledgeable socialized leaders like Northern's Gabi, and not with distrusted CCMI-Im-C practicing personalized leaders (Poulin et al., 2007) like Yatzek who suppressed employees' voices (e.g., Fast et al., 2014) but despite immoral stupid dysfunctioning 'jumped' higher due to CEO patronage (Luthans, 1988).

5. Prevalent Use of CCMI Nurtured Im-C Practicing 'Parachuted'

Executives

The term 'jumper', utilized in the literature, emphasizes an individual's initiative, while the Israeli term 'Parachuted Manager' emphasizes structural change: rather than promotion through the ranks an outsider who advanced elsewhere takes the helm due to higher-ups' choice, which is often self-serving. Literature critical of 'parachuting' (Bower, 2007; Groysberg et al., 2006; Johnson, 2008; Khurana, 2002) missed the vicious distrust and ignorance cycles due to the CCMI-Im-C practices of 'parachutists', which deter locals' knowledge-sharing and keep 'parachutists' ignorant of their own ignorance. A 'parachutist's stupid mismanagement furthers insiders' negativism and distrust, as their know-how and *phronesis* could have prevented mistakes if s/he admitted ignorance, while her/his job dysfunction furthers frustrate locals, both those who expected promotion to the job and others down the line who expected subsequent promotions. S/he is often empowered by 'parachuting' lieutenant loyalists and others of 'her/his kind' (Moore, 1962), which furthers insiders' animosity and resistance up to total failure (Gouldner 1954, 1955; Johnson, 2008).

An experienced 'parachutist' may avoid this by detached 'riding' on mid-levellers' successes and defending her/his authority by hard-to-detect subterfuges. Many of the PMs studied had experience with 'parachuting'; they probably knew the dangers of CEOs' immoral subterfuges and the critical importance of proving loyalty, while mid-level *pe'ilim* were first-time 'parachutists' not familiar with the immoral subterfuges of large bureaucracies. Unaware of their plausibility, they often missed that proving loyalty by an 'upward looking posture' could help defend themselves from a boss's subterfuges. The above cited minimizing of

communication with CCMI user bosses and mid-levelers' downward gaze, seeking performance by vulnerable involvement, help explain how some of bosses' immoral subterfuges were missed. For instance, TM Thomas explained his 19 hour working days during Merkaz's high season thus:

'I like to sleep in a bed that I myself have made'.

A manager with experience with low-trust bureaucracies knew that even 19 hours-a-day effort cannot guarantee job success without some loyalty to the boss to gain his goodwill and support and minimize immoral subterfuges. But ignorant PMs like Moav expected mid-levelers to provide active proofs of their personal loyalty in order to gain good will: a new chief electrician *pa'il*, who did not bother to prove his loyalty to Moav as he was very busy solving grave electrical problems left unattended by his predecessor, was not invited to the Management Committee of which his inept but loyal predecessor was a member. Worse still, despite his job success he was not rewarded by a proper company car and left early.

A mid-leveler's 'upward looking posture' to conservative CCMI-Im-C practicing 'jumper' PMs may be costly even without bosses' knowledge. For instance, Southern Gin's *rotational* PMs boasted high productivity achieved by TM-2 Yunus' leadership. Yunus was an experienced TM brought from another processing plant by vulnerably involved *pa'il* PM-1 to replace mediocre TM-1. He succeeded by trustful vulnerable involvement like Thomas and Gabi, innovating even against manufacturers' recommendations when backed by PM-1 and encouraged by PM-2 who said: 'Do as you please, I understand nothing about it in any case'. CCMI user conservative PM-3 and 4 made him cautious, deferring innovations until bosses sought them and wasting time and attention on proving loyalty. Expert employees' trust in him suffered as politics rather than professional considerations dictated decisions, brain-drain ensued, 'worst trouble-makers' (McGregor, 1960) advanced to jobs vacated by leavers, and one of them became the hired employees' leader and initiated industrial conflicts. PM-4 tried suppression by subterfuges and PM-5 fired them all, importing greenhorn young educated but ginning-ignorant kibbutz members. Yunus' proficiency plus his 18 hour work days during the season rescued the plant, which regained high productivity but not its former high fiber quality.

Successful 'riding' on mid-levelers' successes, plus CEOs' auspices, convinced CCMI-Im-C user PMs of the merit of these practices even though one occasionally repeated a major fault of his predecessor. For example, PM Yuval empowered himself by 'parachuting' young *pa'il* Avi as Deputy TM. Senior hired employees hated Yuval's and Avi's CCMI, amateurish

stupid orders and frustrating promotion expectations; they retaliated by minimally informing them, prompting their failed learning (Shapira, 1995b, 2015a). Yuval's ignorance of his own ignorance and Avi's CCMI caused Yuval to miss Avi's failed learning during his year and a half as deputy TM; he was promoted to TM and failed miserably. As cited, Thomas rescued the plant while Avi became his assistant but continued designated 'TM' with status privileges and insignia, to camouflage his demotion (Levenson, 1961: 374). When Shavit replaced Yuval he continued this immoral sinecure (Dalton, 1959: 172) as it served controlling empowered-by-successes TM Thomas. This continued for four years until Thomas left; Avi's CCMI misled ignorant Shavit to miss that Avi remained incompetent, a 'half-baked manager' (Dore, 1973: 54); he was promoted to TM and once more failed miserably, causing a major season-long debacle that cost Merkaz and its farmers US \$450-500,000 (Current prices). Only an immoral subterfuge by Shavit's patron detached CEO Zelikovich saved his career (Shapira, 2013).

Another long-term negative effect that encouraged managerial immorality was the rise to power of worthless incompetent immoral 'brambles' (thorn bushes) against which the Holy Bible warns us (Judges: Ch. 9, par. 8-16), reverberating in McGregor's (1960) warning of the rise of 'worst trouble-makers'. One such bramble was chief technician and head of Merkaz's Union Committee, Atad, who rose to this status due to brain-drain caused by Merkaz's CCMI-Im-C practicing PMs. Veteran certified practical engineer, ex-foreman and garage manager Levi depicted Atad's early days in Merkaz towards the end of PM Moav's era thus:

'Atad cursed me because when he was in my team he had to work. He used to do terrible things from the professional point of view. He went from one extreme to the other; plainly irresponsible. He walked around a lot, smelt here smelt there; he is a guy who knows how to get around [problematic] things. I would not rely on his welding if it had anything to do with carrying heavy weights'.

The opinions of other employees were similar (Shapira, In print). Involved deputy PM Yaakov discerned the loafing and subterfuges of the new worker Atad but Moav refused Yaakov's demand to fire Atad as the latter made do with a low salary. Atad improved his behaviour for a season and got greenhorn CCMI user *pa'il* deputy PM Yuval to grant him a permanent position. Likewise, he misled and advanced further to become the hired employees' leader with each subsequent 'parachutist' missing his tricks: TM Avi, TM Thomas and PM Shavit. The owner of a large store for technical supplies and an ex-foreman mentioned Atad as one of Merkaz's 'people who really sabotage the work', and added:

‘You say that Atad has become the head of the union committee? I can well imagine how [bad] the gin plant looks like now. I was one of the foremen who demanded to sack him. I refused to have him in my shift after all sorts of subterfuges against me’.

CCMI-Im-C practicing managers elevated ‘brambles’ as their spies (PM Yatzek, above) or ‘two way funnels’ (Dalton, 1959: 232-3), such as Atad and another ‘bramble’ in Moav’s days. A ‘funnel’ supplied the PM with vital information about goings on at the plant, informed him of employees’ views and conveyed his views to employees; for these services the ‘funnel’ was rewarded and his status elevated. Atad deceived ignorant PM Shavit concerning his lazy loafers’ clique, preventing Shavit from distinguishing between inexpert loafers and committed experts (e.g., Collins and Weinel, 2011) and preventing him from rewarding the latter (e.g., as cited, Lowland’s garage manager). Retaining lazy loafers who made do with low salaries came at the expense of committed workers pressed to work harder to overcome the idleness and mistakes of the loafers, a major reason mentioned in interviews for brain-drain that enabled the ascendance of ‘brambles’. ‘Bramble’ Atad also used advantageous insider knowledge to win over CCMI user ‘jumper’ bosses, profoundly negatively impacting PM Shavit’s decision-making. In the above major debacle Atad’s clique supported Avi’s mistakes and bluffs, thwarting Shavit’s problem-solving. Atad led hired employee ‘Italian Strikes’ ahead of season and obtained excessive pay rises for his clique of loafer foremen but only little for committed workers. He also damaged work by leading unjustified clashes with managers and modelled irresponsibility which others followed (Shapira, In print).

‘Worst trouble-makers’ thrived in CCMI-Im-C-managed gin plants, as ‘jumpers’ ignorance made employees’ know-how and *phronesis* particularly scarce resources. *Pe’ilim* succumbed to despised Atad, as he seemingly shared local knowledge in return for benefits while actually manipulating them for his own ends. They knew that they were being manipulated and caught a few bluffs, but missed major manipulations. Deputy PM Danton even called Atad ‘the biggest liar in Merkaz’ in front of others of his clique. This insult did not cause a protest as this clique lying was common, for instance its support of Avi’s bluffing in the major debacle.

Knowing they were surrounded by bluffs, CCMI user PMs retaliated by secrecy and immoral subterfuges, but these legitimized subordinates’ counter subterfuges (Boddy et al., 2010; Bratton and Kacmar, 2004; Collinson, 2005; Burawoy, 1979). Controlling employees by privileging and promoting based on loyalty spared CCMI user PMs some need for supervision during which their ignorance might have been exposed, but this detachment prevented them from discerning subordinates who deserved reward as PM Moav, for instance, missed the

effectiveness of the new electrician and, unrewarded, he left early.

Executives' CCMI-Im-C took many forms. The Lowland Regional Council head Avraham established Lowland Gin. After the first season the hired PM was fired due to excessive salary demands and Avraham assumed the job as absentee PM, keeping his former job while a hired technician TM-1, veteran of two earlier 'jumps' became the acting PM as absent Avraham made only major decisions. TM-1 was highly committed and effective at first, but soon commenced using immoral subterfuges, became autocratic and caused distrust and brain-drain. Plant's functioning deteriorated while TM-1 travelled abroad 'dozens of times', defending his power by rotation: on each trip abroad another foreman replaced him. Avraham self-servingly allowed this irresponsible mismanagement, while the I-KRC CEOs used detached CCMI.

Similarly immoral were the two consecutive Valley I-KRC CEOs, who allowed gin PM David 15 years of detachment from technical domains as 'I did not want to descend to the level of shift foreman and to take care of technical problems, since it was not my domain'. This was an irresponsible choice that left most major decisions to the CCMI user TM who admitted his mediocrity, attested by many others and by lagging productivity and fibre quality: 'I am an ordinary man, a hired worker who does not care much for the interests of the kibbutzim [in best ginning]. I have a [new] deputy *pa'il* who is a certified engineer; for him all that I have learned through hard work, all those 27 years, is only the tip of his finger nail'.

This TM's CCMI trick was avoidance of all Israeli TMs, contrary to the industry's norms of openly consulting with them; he consulted only with his Californian second hand equipment supplier and friend unknown to other Israeli TMs. Partially involved David used the 'indulgency pattern' (Gouldner, 1954), i.e., employee cooperation elicited through paternalistic leniency; it prevented strikes but not the plant's mediocre functioning and backwardness, which his two detached CEOs never questioned.

6. Conclusions and Plausible Solutions

6.1 Conclusions

Thick description (Geertz, 1973) of a multi-site longitudinal semi-native anthropology made by a managerially educated ex-manager untangled that 'jumper'/'parachuted' executives mostly opted to CCMI-Im-C, which was a dark secret that defended their authority, jobs and careers. The kibbutz *rotatzia* norm encouraged career advancement by 'jumping', much like

corporate careers. ‘Jumpers’ faced large knowledge gaps, which curbed the psychological safety required for jeopardizing authority by ignorance exposure in order to learn job-essential knowledge. However, versus a majority of at least 69% (22 of 32) who were CCMI-Im-C practicing executives who used either detachment or autocratic seduction-coercion, only a minority of 20% (3 of 15) of mid-level *pe'ilim* opted for CCMI-Im-C; an 80% majority chose ignorance-exposing vulnerable involvement, created trust and learning cycles and were high-moral job-effective managers. Only 22% (7 of 32) of the executives were, likewise, effective high-moral (data for 3 new PMs was inconclusive). Though there was no rigour sampling, rather the contrasting preferences of different ranks answers the first research question in the affirmative, mid-levelers’ career advancement strategies tend to contrast with those of executives.

The findings indicate that the minimal research of managerial careerism missed major insights concerning ‘jumping’ careers and their impact on ‘jumpers’ morality:

1. Problematic job-ignorance accompanies ‘jumping’; overcoming it requires jeopardizing ‘jumpers’ managerial authority more than required of insiders in order to create virtuous trust and learning cycles that make a manager job-competent,
2. Managerial power tempts many ‘jumpers’ to use CCMI instead,
3. Use of CCMI engenders vicious distrust and ignorance cycles, causing incompetence and mismanagement that bar advancement by performance and encourage Im-C.

The findings corroborate literature critical of ‘jumping’ (Bower, 2007; Groysberg et al., 2006; Johnson, 2008; Khurana, 2002) and of *rotatzia* that encourages it (Gabriel and Savage, 1981; Henderson, 1990; Segal, 1981; Vald, 1987); they show that insights, which primarily explain encouragement of CCMI-Im-C by ‘jumping’, went unnoticed. Other explanations are provided by findings on mid-levelers’ opposite tendency to that of executives, which answer the second research question, untangling that executives were mostly immoral like kibbutz prime leaders versus rare immorality among mid-levelers, unlike the immorality cascading hypothesis (Jackall, 1988: 95). These findings were:

1. Executives were mostly ‘parachuted’ by patrons, while mid-levelers mostly promoted due to performance which they also sought in I-KRC jobs by trust-creating vulnerable involvement; executives mostly stuck to patronage strategy through loyalty to bosses and practicing CCMI-Im-C.
2. Executives’ power encouraged use of CCMI, which kept them ignorant of own ignorance,

contrary to mid-levelers' learning about their own ignorance by its exposure; unknowing their own ignorance encouraged executives' Im-C by veiling its negative results.

3. Executives' problem-solving required mustering a variety of experts' contributions (Bennis, 1989), which required discerning experts from non-experts (Collins and Weinel, 2011), and learning diverse knowledge, barred by using CCMI that led to Im-C; mid-levelers' opposite strategy enhanced learning, job-functioning and avoidance of Im-C.

4. Patronage by detached CEOs encouraged PMs' immoral subterfuges unavailable to weak mid-levelers, such as 'riding' on subordinates' successes and usurping them (Shapira, 1987: 95), scapegoating them for PMs' own failures (Hughes, 1958) and the like.

5. Mid-levelers' unfruitful minimal communication with CCMI-Im-C practicing superiors barred promotion by patronage and discouraged CCMI-Im-C; patronage was essential for executives, saved their jobs, power and careers from failures caused by ignorance.

6. Executives involved in I-KRC and I-KO politics were more aware than mid-levelers of the dominance of sponsored mobility in the kibbutz oligarchic field, another reason for patronage seeking which rarely interested mid-levelers.

Previous contextualization of I-KRC findings in the kibbutz field without discerning *pe'ilim* ranks concluded that the immorality of prime kibbutz leaders cascaded to most *pe'ilim* through the ranks (Shapira, 2015b). However, discerning between the ranks found that immorality cascaded to CCMI user executives tuned to immoral patrons' expectations, seeking their help in defending jobs and power and advancing careers, but rarely cascaded further to mid-levelers who mostly preferred performance-based promotion and practicing high-moral trustworthy leadership (Burns, 1978; Graham, 1991; O'Toole, 1999; Raelin, 2013). The immorality cascading hypothesis (Jackall, 1988: 95) seems accurate only for managers with an 'upward looking posture', characteristic of 'jumpers' who practice CCMI-Im-C.

Books tell managers they cannot and need not acquire local expertises as they have experts for these, but managers need socially learned knowledge to discern true experts from smart bluffers, impostors, 'brambles' and other in-experts who just talk experts' language (Collins and Weinel, 2011; Kets De Vries, 1993; Shapira, In print). This knowledge includes experts' language (Collins, 2011), experts' decision-making premises (Simon, 1957), local problem-solving (Fine, 2012), interactional expertise (Collins and Evens, 2007) and more. Without such knowledge, 'good work is not paid for, only talking and image building are paid, ingratiating the boss instead of doing good work' (Lowland's garage manager); this rarely

bothered detached and/or autocratic ‘jumper’ executives who generated vicious distrust and ignorance cycles, not really knowing how the plants functioned despite their mismanagement. Using CCMI led them to Im-C not only because of their inability to advance by performance, but also because they missed the injustices that their mismanagement caused employees. Kanter (1977), Jackall (1988) and others depicted corporations as organized irresponsibility, while the findings explain this by ‘jumper’ executives’ use of CCMI, sparing their conscience pangs by not knowing the vicious outcomes of their immorality.

Insider managers may also choose CCMI-Im-C, since every promotion causes ignorance: One takes charge of unfamiliar units/functions which s/he did not experience, has no feel of their stuff, does not know their staffs’ expertises, and has little of their tacit know-how and *phronesis*. However, the larger knowledge gaps of ‘jumpers’ give them a stronger incentive to use CCMI and to advance their career by repeated ‘jumps’ while practicing CCMI-Im-C. This suggests that ‘jumping’ careers nurture immoral executives more than inside careers.

6.2 Plausible Solutions

6.2.1 A Trust-Based Escalating Majority Solution for Executives Succession

I-KRCs’ immoral CEOs enjoyed the auspices of self-serving old guard prime kibbutz leaders (Shapira, 2005, 2008). Neither leadership life cycle theory students (Hambrick, 2007) nor students of democratic organizations (Nilsson et al., 2009; Russel, 1995; Stryjan, 1989) have studied provisions aimed at curbing leaders’ oligarchic tendencies. Generous severance benefits for CEOs’ early retirement, known as ‘Golden Parachutes’, are not a true solution. Vancil (1987: 79) asserted that this expensive instrument is a success, as only 13% of CEOs remained longer than the maximum anticipated tenure of 12 years, but this minority included many immoral CEOs (Ailon, 2015; Gini, 1998; Villette and Vuillermot, 2009). Secondly, self-serving deeds are encouraged, such as adding outsiders to the Board who as directors have granted generous ‘parachutes’ elsewhere (Davis, 1994: 220).

Successes of democratic firms suggest that a democracy which includes knowledgeable high-moral mid-levellers in succession decisions beside directors and executives can curb oligarchization and Im-C (Erdal, 2011; Semler, 1993; Shapira, 2008; Whyte and Whyte, 1988). Im-C can also discourage periodic tests of trust in a leader, say re-election every four years like US presidents. However, the many cases of successful leaders who managed to function effectively for more than eight years advocate allowing such leaders longer tenures but with a provision that would limit tenures and keep leaders replaceable. As leaders were

rarely really replaced democratically after more than 16 years in jobs, this seems to be the correct limit.

However, even allowing a leader 12 years is of special importance, as it can make her/him democratically irreplaceable. For instance, Roosevelt's 3rd term helped his 4th election in, 1944 despite his deficient functioning for most of that year (Wikipedia: Roosevelt). A plausible solution that would timely replace dysfunctional leaders is requiring a 67% majority for a 3rd term and over 88% for a 4th term (Shapira, 2013: 24). Thus, a 5th term threshold on the same gradient should have to be above 100%, i.e., impossible. A higher majority threshold for political decisions of special importance is common in democracies, and the crucial problem of leaders' oligarchization justifies its use.

6.2.2 Insider Successors Preference

Succession studies failed for half a century to conclude whether insiders or outsiders were preferable (Karaevli, 2007) while recent studies found superiority of insiders (Bower, 2007; Collins, 2001; Shapira, 2013). Bower (2007) explained it by their smaller knowledge gaps, while my findings indicate that the main positive effect of smaller knowledge gaps is granting insiders psychological safety to expose ignorance and generate virtuous trust and learning cycles. Often insiders led successful democratic firms since a truly democratic vote took place when the choice was between known alternatives; 'parachutists' are less known than insiders and they can enhance self-presentation (Boddy et al., 2010, Dalton, 1959, Goffman, 1959; Wexler, 2006) assisted by 'the neighbour's grass is greener' effect. To mitigate these advantages, yardsticks for executive selection can be added:

1. Did a candidate practice vulnerable involvement in practitioner deliberations and create trust and learning cycles in previous jobs?
2. How much a candidate acquire, by such learning, referred and interactional expertises for the firm's major problems?
3. Did a candidate achieve successes by trustful high-moral transformational leadership (Burns, 1978, Graham, 1991) in previous jobs?

Measuring candidates by these yardsticks bars 'jumper' who practice CCMI-Im-C and prefers trusted involved insiders as their record concerning these yardsticks is more reliably known (Dalton, 1959: 149). However, further study of these yardsticks' relative weight in foreseeing who among candidates will choose trust-creating vulnerable involvement is in order. Research is also required of the relative weight of the factors that impact this choice:

1. Involvement habitus,
2. Relevancy of expertises,
3. Previous leadership style,
4. Perceived career prospects of alternative advancement routes,
5. Organizational contexts that encourage/discourage each choice.

A radical change of attitude to the study of ‘jumpers’ coping with their problematic ignorance is required; this requires more longitudinal ethnographies, much lengthier and extensive than usual organizational ethnographies, and they must be *phronetic*, seeking concrete, practical and ethical answers to major troubling questions concerning power-holders in one’s society (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Shapira, 2012b).

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